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ABOUT THE CHILDREN 
ACHIEVING CHALLENGE 
 
In February 1995, shortly after the School 
Board of Philadelphia adopted Children 
Achieving as a systemic reform agenda to 
improve the Philadelphia public schools, 
the Annenberg Foundation designated 
Philadelphia as one of a few American 
cities to receive a five-year $50 million 
Annenberg Challenge grant to improve 
public education. 
 
Among the conditions for receiving the 
grant was a requirement to raise two 
matching dollars ($100 million over five 
years) for each one received from the 
Annenberg Foundation and to create an 
independent management structure to 
provide program, fiscal, and evaluation 
oversight of the grant. In Philadelphia, a 
business organization, Greater Philadelphia 
First, assumed this responsibility, and with 
it, the challenge of building and sustaining 
civic support for the improvement of public 
education in the city. 
 
Philadelphia’s Children Achieving was a 
sweeping systemic reform initiative. 
Systemic reform eschews a school-by-
school approach to reform and relies on 
coherent policy, improved coordination of 
resources and services, content and 
performance standards, decentralization of 
decision-making, and accountability 
mechanisms to transform entire school 
systems. Led by a dynamic superintendent 
and central office personnel, Children 
Achieving was the first attempt by an urban 
district to test systemic reform in practice.   
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF 
CHILDREN ACHIEVING 
 
In 1996, the Consortium for Policy Research 
in Education (CPRE) at the University of 
Pennsylvania and its partner, Research for 
Action (RFA), were charged by the Children 
Achieving Challenge with the evaluation of 
Children Achieving. Between the 1995-
1996 and 2000-2001 school years, CPRE 
and RFA researchers interviewed hundreds 
of teachers, principals, parents, students, 
District officials, and civic leaders; sat in on 
meetings where the plan was designed, 
debated, and revised; observed its 
implementation in classrooms and schools; 
conducted two systemwide surveys of 
teachers; and carried out independent 
analyses of the District’s test results and 
other indicators of system performance. An 
outline of the research methods used by 
CPRE and RFA is included in this report. A 
listing of the reports on Children Achieving 
currently available from CPRE is found 
below. There will be one additional 
summary report released in the coming 
months. It will be available when it is 
released on the CPRE web site at 
www.cpre.org. 
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CHILDREN ACHIEVING’S 
THEORY OF ACTION 
 
To assess the progress and effects of a 
comprehensive reform such as Children 
Achieving, it is essential to understand its 
“theory of action,” that is, the assumptions 
made about what actions or behaviors will 
produce the desired effects. A summary of 
the Children Achieving theory of action 
follows: 
 
Given high academic standards and strong 
incentives to focus their efforts and 
resources; more control over school 
resource allocations, organization, policies, 
and programs; adequate funding and 
resources; more hands-on leadership and 
high-quality support; better coordination of 
resources and programs; schools 
restructured to support good teaching and 
encourage improvement of practice; rich 
professional development of their own 
choosing; and increased public 
understanding and support; the teachers 
and administrators of the Philadelphia 
schools will develop, adopt, or adapt 
instructional technologies and patterns of 
behavior that will help all children reach the 
District’s high standards. 
 
ADDITIONAL READING 
ON CHILDREN 
ACHIEVING 
 
The following publications on the 
evaluation of Children Achieving are 
currently available through CPRE at (215) 
573-0700, or email your requests to 
cpre@gse.upenn.edu. 
 
• Recruiting and Retaining Teachers: Keys 
to Improving the Philadelphia Public 
Schools (May 2001) 
 
• School Leadership and Reform: Case 
Studies of Philadelphia Principals (May 
2001) 
 
• Contradictions and Control in Systemic 
Reform: The Ascendancy of the Central 
Office in Philadelphia Schools (August 
2001) 
 
• Clients, Consumers, or Collaborators? 
Parents and their Roles in School 
Reform During Children Achieving, 
1995-2000 (August 2001) 
 
• Powerful Ideas, Modest Gains: Five 
Years of Systemic Reform in 
Philadelphia Middle Schools (December 
2001) 
 
• An Analysis of the Effect of Children 
Achieving on Student Achievement in 
Philadelphia Elementary Schools 
(February 2002) 
 
• Civic Engagement and Urban School 
Improvement: Hard-to-Learn Lessons 
from Philadelphia (June 2002) 
 
AUTHORS’ NOTE 
 
The research reported herein was 
conducted by the Consortium for Policy 
Research in Education and Research for 
Action. Funding for this work was provided 
by Greater Philadelphia First and the Pew 
Charitable Trusts. Opinions expressed in 
this report are those of the authors, and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of Greater 
Philadelphia First, the Pew Charitable 
Trusts, or the institutional partners of 
CPRE. 
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CHILDREN ACHIEVING 
EVALUATION 1995-
2001: RESEARCH 
METHODS 
 
 
The Consortium for Policy Research in 
Education and Research for Action used 
the research methods indicated below in 
their evaluation of the Children Achieving 
Challenge. 
 
1. 1996-2000 school-level data on 
indicators that made up the District’s 
Performance Responsibility Index 
including student scores on the SAT-9, 
student promotion and graduation 
rates, student attendance, and teacher 
attendance. 
 
2. Two census surveys of teachers, the first 
in 1997 and the second in 1999. 
Teachers were asked about reform 
implementation, school conditions, and 
teaching practices. There was a greater 
than 60 percent response rate on both 
surveys. 
 
3. School indicators describing teacher 
and student characteristics in 1996 and 
1999 obtained from the School District 
of Philadelphia’s Information Services. 
These data included school enrollment, 
number of teachers, the proportion of 
students qualifying for free or reduced- 
price lunch, among other indicators. 
These data were used for descriptive 
purposes and in hierarchical linear and 
logistic regression models to help 
understand the relationships among 
reform implementation, student 
outcomes, and school characteristics.   
 
4. Five years (1995-1996 through 1999-
2000) of qualitative research in 49 
schools (26 elementary, 11 middle, and 
12 high schools) in 14 clusters.  
Qualitative research included: 
interviews of teachers, principals, 
parents, outside partners who worked 
in the schools, and in a few cases, 
students; observations of classrooms, 
small learning communities meetings, 
professional development sessions, and 
school leadership team meetings; 
review of school documents (School 
Improvement Plan, budget, etc.); and 
intensive, multi-year case study 
research in a subset of 25 schools (13 
elementary, 5 middle, and 7 high 
schools). 
 
5. Interviews of central office and cluster 
staff and observations of meetings and 
other events. 
 
6. Interviews of 40 Philadelphia civic 
leaders (including political leaders, 
leaders in the funding community, 
public education advocates, journalists, 
and business leaders).  
 
In addition, numerous other studies 
conducted during Children Achieving 
informed this evaluation. These included: 
Bruce Wilson and Dick Corbett’s three-year 
interview study of middle school students; 
an evaluation of the Philadelphia Urban 
Systemic Initiative in Mathematics and 
Science conducted by Research for Action; 
the Philadelphia Education Longitudinal 
Study conducted by Frank Furstenberg at 
the University of Pennsylvania; and the 
evaluation of the William Penn 
Foundation’s initiative in two clusters, 
conducted by the National Center for 
Restructuring Education, Schools, and 
Teaching. 
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INTRODUCTION 
   
n 1994, David Hornbeck came to 
Philadelphia with a bold plan to do 
what “no city with any significant 
number and diversity of students” had 
ever done before: help “a large 
proportion of its young people achieve at 
high levels.”1 Trained as an attorney and 
minister, Hornbeck had served as 
Commissioner of education in Maryland 
and had been one of the architects of 
Kentucky’s Education Reform Act, a 
standards-based reform effort that coupled 
school-level accountability with significant 
increases in funding for public education. 
Philadelphia’s corporate and civic leaders 
and its Democratic mayor, Ed Rendell, 
were impressed with Hornbeck’s 
credentials and saw standards and 
accountability as a potentially winning 
formula for Philadelphia’s poorly 
performing schools. They looked to him to 
turn the system around.  
 
Shortly after the Philadelphia School Board 
adopted Hornbeck’s Children Achieving 
reform program, the Annenberg 
Foundation designated Philadelphia as one 
of three American cities to receive a five-
year $50 million Annenberg Challenge 
grant.2 (See Sidebar 1 at the end of this 
section for a timeline of the Children 
Achieving initiative.) The stars seemed 
aligned for real educational improvement. 
One local foundation staff member 
expressed the prevailing view: “We believe 
that if not now in Philadelphia, then 
when?”3  
 
                                                          
1 School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving 
strategic action design. Philadelphia: Author, 1995, 
p. i. 
 
2 For a further discussion of the role of the Children 
Achieving Challenge and Greater Philadelphia First in 
Children Achieving, see the section entitled, 
“Children Achieving: A Calculated Risk.”   
 
3 Foundation staff, 1996. 
But in June 2000, in the face of a huge 
budget deficit, declining support from 
newly-elected Mayor John Street, and the 
threat of a state takeover, Superintendent 
Hornbeck resigned, rather than oversee the 
dismantling of his vision for a system in 
which all children would achieve at high 
levels. Within a year, Pennsylvania 
contracted with Edison Schools, the largest 
for-profit provider of educational services 
in the country, to review the District and 
provide recommendations for a major 
overhaul of the city’s public schools. By 
December 2001, the Governor and Mayor 
Street agreed to terms for the state to take 
direct control over Philadelphia’s public 
school system — a move originally 
contested by Mayor Street. Under the 
“friendly” takeover, a five-member School 
Reform Commission (SRC) — three 
members appointed by the Governor and 
two by the Mayor — replaced the Board of 
Education. The SRC quickly took the 
unprecedented step of requesting 
proposals from private firms, institutions, 
and community organizations to perform a 
sweeping array of central office functions.  
At the time that this report went to press, 
Edison Schools had assumed the role of 
“senior management consultant” and the 
SRC had chosen a variety of sponsoring 
organizations, including national for-profit 
education management organizations and 
community groups, to run 70 of the 
District’s lowest performing schools.     
 
Ironically, although Children Achieving was 
publicly discredited by local and state 
leaders, the reform had made headway 
during its six years of implementation. 
Elementary school students showed 
significant improvement on the SAT-9 test 
(the Stanford Achievement Test-Ninth 
Edition), the District’s standardized test 
measure. And public education had 
become a front-page story in a city where 
there had been apathy and little discussion. 
Public reporting of school-by-school test 
data and data disaggregated by 
race/ethnicity and income level had set the 
I
2 Civic Engagement and Urban School Improvement: Hard-to-Learn Lessons from Philadelphia 
 
 
stage for educators to be held accountable 
for results. Community organizing and a 
public information campaign had 
encouraged greater public engagement. In 
fact, some believed that the District’s 
progress during Children Achieving had 
been remarkable and were incredulous that 
there was not broader acknowledgment of 
Philadelphia’s achievements: 
 
Philadelphia made a remarkable amount of 
progress masked by political turmoil in the 
District, city, and state. And it made 
progress even with union opposition, with 
a split board against David, and with critics 
of David at the city and state levels.   
 
Philadelphia launched an almost decade-
long effort to restructure its schools into 
smaller communities. There were 
demonstrable results in improvements on 
the accountability index. Attendance 
increased, showing greater student 
engagement. There was an increase in 
performance at lower levels of progress — 
with the students below basic and basic. 
The creation of organizations like the 
Alliance Organizing Project shows 
progress. And along with that, efforts to 
develop standards at the local level 
demonstrated progress. Teachers were 
also given the tools to put standards into 
practice with curriculum frameworks.4 
 
Why were the District’s accomplishments 
not more widely recognized? What was it 
about the vision, strategies, and style of 
reform leaders; the reform plan and its 
implementation; the views and actions of 
government, business, and civic leaders; 
and the larger economic and political 
context that produced a shift toward a 
radically different model of school reform? 
 
In this report, we examine how reform 
leaders — faced with the daunting task of 
improving student achievement while the 
dollars available for public education were 
                                                          
4 Civic leader, October 2000. 
actually shrinking — tried to build the 
public support necessary to convince 
lawmakers that an increase in spending 
would be a sound investment. We tell the 
story from the perspectives of Philadelphia 
civic elites. Interviews with more than 40 of 
Philadelphia’s leaders from government, 
business, civic organizations, higher 
education, the media, and the School 
District during the period January 2000-
January 2001 serve as the basis for our 
account. (See Appendix A for a discussion 
of our research methods.) 
 
From its inception, Children Achieving was 
a calculated risk by District leaders who 
believed that they could effect sufficient 
gains in student achievement to convince 
the public and political leaders to increase 
the dollar investment in the city’s schools. 
Initially, the Children Achieving reform plan 
was championed by key sectors of the 
community — the business and foundation 
communities, civic leaders, and the mayor. 
However, a deeper reading of the interview 
transcripts revealed that, in fact, our 
informants had varying and sometimes 
competing interpretations of the reform’s 
major ideas and how those ideas would 
work together to effect improvement in 
schools and student achievement. Our 
research shows how difficult it is to create 
resilient civic coalitions that persist in the 
face of the harsh circumstances of 
inadequate funding. It signals the problems 
that arise for reform leaders as they try to 
communicate easily-understood messages 
about complex ideas like standards, 
accountability, and decentralization and as 
they report student progress on leading 
achievement indicators within a context of 
very low absolute performance.   
 
WHY THIS REPORT IS 
IMPORTANT NOW 
 
A premise of Ambassador Annenberg’s 
unprecedented gift to American public 
education was that “something should be 
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done to improve [public schools] and that 
something could be done,”5 and that a 
city’s leaders and citizens were key to the 
success of its schools.  
 
Schools would improve only when 
communities realized it was in their own 
best interests to take the tough political 
steps necessary to provide a good 
education for every child. They would 
improve when private citizens and 
institutions became willing to invest 
substantial amounts of time, energy, and 
money in public education — not just for 
their own children, but for “other people’s” 
children as well. Annenberg hoped his own 
financial commitment would galvanize this 
nationwide effort in localities around the 
country, with his dollars matching new ones 
that local planners would raise.6 
 
The Annenberg Challenge’s emphasis on 
civic engagement was well justified to 
many who have studied urban school 
reform and analyzed its failures in cities 
such as Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, San 
Antonio, San Francisco, and Seattle. These 
educational policy analysts argue that deep 
and enduring reform requires more than a 
strong leader with a plausible plan. Leaders 
of a city’s important institutions and 
grassroots groups must offer critical 
support. Additionally, educational theorists 
currently argue that reformers must be 
flexible in their development of reform 
approaches. They believe that no single 
approach to educational reform offers a 
sufficiently robust strategy to turn failing 
urban school districts around.7 
 
                                                          
5 B. Cervone and J. McDonald, Preliminary reflections 
on the Annenberg Challenge: A working paper 
drawn from its first projects. Providence, RI: 
Annenberg Challenge, 1999, p. 1. 
 
6 Ibid, p. 4. 
 
7 P. Hill, J. Harvey, and C. Campbell, It takes a city: 
Getting serious about urban school reform. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 
 
Public schools in Philadelphia are about to 
enter into a new educational experiment, 
one that puts school governance in the 
hands of the state and involves private 
enterprise and community groups on an 
unprecedented scale in the running of 
central office functions and the operation 
of schools. Is civic engagement in public 
schools even relevant under these 
circumstances? Historians and political 
scientists who have researched this 
question would argue, “Yes.” In their study 
of civic engagement in public schools in 11 
cities, Clarence Stone and his colleagues 
found that educational improvement 
faltered when there was low civic capacity 
for reforming schools.8 In two of the cities 
studied, schools were governed by court 
order as a result of desegregation cases. In 
both cases, public engagement was low in 
part because citizens considered the 
schools to be the domain of the courts. Will 
Philadelphians and others sit back and 
relegate improvement of the city’s schools 
to the School Reform Commission? To 
date, state takeovers of urban districts have 
proved moderately successful at 
ameliorating financial crises and cleaning 
up graft. Thus far, they have not succeeded 
in improving educational programs and 
raising student achievement.9   
 
It is likely that the public will remains a 
crucial factor in reform’s success — no 
matter what the governance structure. The 
past offers some lessons about how to 
accomplish this. This report offers the 
larger public a framework for evaluating 
what the new players in Philadelphia 
schools propose and undertake. (We 
believe the framework is also useful to 
                                                          
8 C. Stone, Civic capacity and urban education. 
Unpublished manuscript, 2001, available at 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gupt/stone/prob.html. 
 
9 K. Wong and P. Jain, “City and state takeover as a 
school reform strategy.” Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the Association for Public Policy 
Analysis and Management, Seattle, WA, November 
2000.  
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citizens in other cities.) During the coming 
months, a variety of strategies for 
improving schools will emerge. Each of 
these proposed reforms is, in fact, a theory 
of action about how to improve education. 
Schon and Argyris elaborated and used the 
concept of theory of action in their work on 
the organizational change process.10 A 
theory of action is the assumptions and 
beliefs that leaders hold about how change 
will occur; in the case of educational 
reform, how reform components will effect 
the desired improvements in schools, 
classrooms, and students.  
 
In this report, we discuss the theory of 
action underlying Children Achieving at 
length. We also identify other theories 
about how to raise student achievement 
that emerged in our interviews with city 
leaders. We do this so as to make these 
various approaches explicit. In order for 
citizens to assess the potential of proposed 
reforms and the success of enacted ones, it 
is important that they understand 
reformers’ assumptions about the causal 
links between a reform’s design, its 
activities, and its goals. It is important to 
ask such questions as: What do reformers 
believe about how their proposals will 
effect improvement? Are their assumptions 
logical? Are the proposals robust and 
strategic? Are their theories of action 
based on past experience, empirical 
evidence, or ideology? And questions 
about the values underlying reform 
proposals and their attention to issues of 
social justice and equity are extremely 
important in a city where more than 80 
percent of students are children of color 
who live in poverty. Whose interests are 
being served by proposed approaches to 
reform? In short, it is important to 
understand and question the theories of 
action underlying the changes proposed by 
                                                          
10 C. Argyris and D.A. Schon, Theory in practice: 
Increasing professional effectiveness. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1974.  
 
reformers so that the public can protect the 
interests of the community’s children and 
increase the likelihood that they will benefit 
from the proposed reforms. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE 
REPORT 
 
We begin with a description of Philadelphia 
and its schools at the time of 
Superintendent Hornbeck’s arrival. What 
was the educational situation prior to 
Children Achieving? What were the 
existing relationships between the District 
and key sectors of the city, including 
business, government, and civic 
organizations? We also discuss our 
informants’ varying perspectives on the 
challenges that confronted the city. Their 
different views on Philadelphia’s problems 
and their relationship to public education 
set the stage for differing assessments of 
Children Achieving’s success. 
 
Children Achieving was an ambitious and 
comprehensive reform plan. We outline the 
plan and discuss how its elements were 
intended to work together to improve 
schools and student achievement. In order 
to understand civic leaders’ assessments of 
Children Achieving’s impact, it is important 
to know how they interpreted its 
foundational ideas and key components. 
How did various groups make sense of the 
plan articulated by District leaders? How 
did they think it was supposed to work? 
We then detail six strategies of District 
leaders to build public support for the 
reforms. We reveal the effects of District 
leaders’ steps and missteps as they sought 
to gain more funding for schools and the 
larger contextual factors that constrained 
their visions and strategies. There were 
significant accomplishments during 
Children Achieving and there are important 
lessons from its disappointments. Finally, 
we summarize these from the perspectives 
of our interviewees in order to define 
common ground for moving forward.  
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SIDEBAR 1. CHILDREN ACHIEVING TIMELINE 
 
 
August 1994 
 
• David Hornbeck appointed Superintendent of Philadelphia schools. 
• Philadelphia Federation of Teachers contract settled. 
 
October 1994 
 
• Philadelphia Inquirer publishes “District in Distress,” its first report card on the state of 
Philadelphia public schools, including information on poverty rates, dropout rates, teachers’ 
salaries, and student performance on the SAT-9. 
 
November 1994 
 
• Tom Ridge (R) elected Governor of Pennsylvania. 
• Mayor Ed Rendell (D) re-elected. 
• As part of a desegregation case against the District, Judge Doris Smith orders the School 
District to submit a plan for reducing racial disparities in student achievement. This comes 
after an education panel’s findings paint a dismal portrait of the Philadelphia school system, 
citing “an overall attitude of helplessness and resignation” about several aspects of the 
District among school staff and from citizens. 
 
February 1995 
 
• Children Achieving Action Design published. 
• Philadelphia receives a $50 million Annenberg Challenge grant, which is matched by $100 
million from Philadelphia corporations, foundations, and federal grants. Greater 
Philadelphia First (GPF) announced as administration site for grant, the Children Achieving 
Challenge, and Vicki Phillips is named Executive Director of the Challenge. 
 
May 1995 
 
• Five months after taking office, Governor Ridge proposes a statewide voucher plan, which 
would provide families throughout Pennsylvania with school vouchers that could be used at 
private, religious, or out-of-district public schools. This is the first of Ridge’s three pushes to 
establish a statewide voucher program, none of which were able to garner needed 
legislative support. 
 
September 1995 
 
• First six clusters formally established. 
• City Council President John Street criticizes the Children Achieving agenda for being too 
complicated. 
 
December 1995 
 
• Standards Writing Teams, composed of parents, teachers, and community members, are 
convened; writing of new academic standards begins. 
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SIDEBAR 1. CHILDREN ACHIEVING TIMELINE (CONTINUED) 
 
 
 February 1996 
 
• Philadelphia Daily News publishes a series of opinion columns that criticize Superintendent 
Hornbeck and Children Achieving. They kick off a series of articles and opinion pieces 
called, “The Great School Debate.” 
 
August 1996 
 
• Standards distributed to teachers for review. 
 
September 1996 
 
• All 22 clusters established. 
• Family Resource Network established to provide support to families. 
 
January 1997 
 
• State Representative Dwight Evans announces legislative proposals to write certain aspects 
of Philadelphia’s education reforms into law. 
 
February 1997 
 
• Hornbeck announces plan to reconstitute Olney and Audenried High Schools, drawing 
harsh criticism from school staff. The plan is abandoned when an external mediator judges 
the process invalid. 
• Mayor Rendell, City Council President Street, Superintendent Hornbeck, School Board 
members, and community leaders issue, Realities Converge: This Year is Different. The 
report details the origins of the District’s fiscal crisis and its future plans for managing the 
deficit. The authors promised a zero-growth School District budget but “drew a line in the 
sand” and refused to cut any more school-based programs. 
• District, city, and community leaders file lawsuit against the state contending that 
Pennsylvania does not provide a “thorough and efficient” education. Case later dismissed 
by state Supreme Court, which ruled that school funding decisions must be made by the 
legislature, not the courts. 
• City Council President John Street, then a candidate for mayor, makes his first public foray 
into working with the public on the issue of education by convening the Philadelphia 
Education Summit. The Summit aimed to stimulate a broad discourse on public education 
issues through televised forums, focus groups, town meetings, and a major conference. 
 
September 1997 
 
• Professional Responsibility Index (PRI) scores made public for the first time. The PRI, which 
had been adopted the previous year by the Board of Education, is intended to provide each 
school with a sense of where it stands along several dimensions, including: standardized 
tests, student and teacher attendance, and promotion and dropout rates. This marks the 
first reporting period of the first two-year accountability cycle (measuring progress from 
1996-1998). Much of the data released at this time are made public for the first time in the 
District’s history. A number of schools show low progress.    
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SIDEBAR 1. CHILDREN ACHIEVING TIMELINE (CONTINUED) 
 
 
January 1998 
 
• Graduation and promotion requirements identified. 
• Vicki Phillips resigns as Executive Director of the Children Achieving Challenge. Suzanne 
Becker replaces her. 
 
February 1998 
 
• Hornbeck threatens to adopt an unbalanced budget if the state does not provide needed 
funds, which could lead to the schools closing before the end of the school year. 
 
March 1998 
 
• The District, city, and other officials and interest groups file a federal civil-rights suit against 
the state, known as Powell v. Ridge. The plaintiffs contend that the state’s funding practices 
discriminate against school districts with large numbers of non-White students.  
 
April 1998 
 
• State legislature responds by passing Act 46, a draconian state takeover law aimed 
specifically at Philadelphia. 
 
March 1999  
 
• Members of GPF’s board stand behind Governor Ridge when he introduces his second 
statewide voucher proposal, designed to provide vouchers to students in the most 
academically troubled school districts throughout Pennsylvania. Again, he lacks the 
legislative support needed to pass the proposal. 
 
November 1999 
 
• Street is elected Mayor. His role in public education is expanded during this election when 
Philadelphians pass a referendum to change the City Charter to allow the Mayor to appoint 
all members of the School Board with terms concurrent to his own. 
 
January 2000 
 
• Street appoints new educational leadership in Philadelphia. He selects a new School Board, 
the first time this has happened in the history of Philadelphia. He retains several, but not all, 
members of the previous Board. Street also appoints the first Secretary of Education for the 
city, Debra Kahn, who is charged with leading the District’s team in negotiation of a new 
teachers’ contract. 
 
March 2000 
 
• Mayor Street holds community meetings about education issues in all 22 clusters. At 
meetings, he solicits input about the schools and warns community members of a looming 
fiscal crisis, asking that they demand an adequately funded school system from elected 
officials at the state level. 
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SIDEBAR 1. CHILDREN ACHIEVING TIMELINE (CONTINUED) 
 
 
May 2000 
 
• The Pennsylvania Legislature passes and Governor Ridge signs the Education 
Empowerment Act, a state reform and “takeover” bill targeted at 11 school districts 
(including Philadelphia) with high student failure rates. 
 
June 2000 
 
• Threat of state takeover crisis in the District during the Republican Convention in 
Philadelphia is averted by a financial settlement between the District and Governor Ridge. 
Still facing a deficit, the School Board cuts the budget and Hornbeck resigns in protest. 
• School District announces number of teaching vacancies. 
• School Board adopts a FY2001 budget with an amount deficit. 
 
August 2000 
 
• Teacher contract expires, beginning two months of tense negotiating between the union 
and the Board of Education. Teachers authorize a strike, but continue to work with the 
knowledge that the District could impose new terms of employment at any point. Shortly 
thereafter, the Board of Education does impose new terms and conditions of employment. 
The union strikes over a weekend. The contract is settled before school is disrupted with 
the intervention of Mayor Street and pressure from Governor Ridge, who threatens a state 
takeover. 
• Board of Education announces decision to adopt a corporate style of management. Deidre 
Farmbry, a veteran Philadelphia educator, appointed Chief Academic Officer. 
 
October 2000 
 
• Philip Goldsmith, a lawyer and journalist, appointed interim Chief Executive Officer of 
District. 
 
January 2001 
 
• Education Week gives Pennsylvania a grade of “D-“ on funding equity in comparison to 
other states. It is followed by only seven other states. 
 
May 2001 
 
• Governor Ridge succeeds in passing an education plan that exchanges an increase in 
teacher pensions for a package of education bills that many observers perceive as a 
backdoor to vouchers. The package includes bills that provide state tax credits of up to 90 
percent to corporations for donations to groups that finance scholarships to private schools 
or public schools outside of students’ home districts. 
• As an economy measure, the District’s 22 clusters are replaced by eight academic offices, 
reducing administrative costs and reassigning some cluster staff to teaching positions. At 
month’s end, the School Board adopts a budget with a $216 million deficit, creating a new 
fiscal crisis with state takeover of the District possible. 
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SIDEBAR 1. CHILDREN ACHIEVING TIMELINE (CONTINUED) 
 
 
July 2001 
 
• Mayor Street and Governor Ridge sign a Memorandum of Understanding giving the 
Governor permission to commission an analysis of the financial and educational state of the 
District. Ridge hires Edison Schools to do the job. 
 
October 2001 
 
• In the aftermath of September’s terrorist attacks, President Bush appoints Governor Ridge 
to U.S. Office of Homeland Security. Lt. Governor Mark Schweiker replaces him. 
• Governor Schweiker passes stealth amendment to Act 46, the state takeover law. It gives 
the state increased power over the governance body outlined in the act. 
• Schweiker releases his proposal for the District, based heavily on Edison’s analysis of the 
District. It includes plans to have a private education management organization (presumably 
Edison Schools) run the central administration and to have Edison run at least 45 schools. 
The Mayor and Governor have a month to negotiate a deal or the state has authority to 
take over the District.  
 
November 2001 
 
• Governor Schweiker backs off of his proposal to have Edison run the District’s central 
administration, but keeps them in a consulting role to the central office and as a private 
manager of schools. 
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PHILADELPHIA AND ITS 
SCHOOLS 
 
THE CITY 
 
he 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were 
disastrous years for Philadelphia. 
When David Hornbeck began his 
tenure as Superintendent, the city 
was recovering from a serious fiscal 
crisis during which it was forced to borrow 
$150 million from its employee pension 
fund just to stay afloat. With its credit 
ruined, the city had to pay more than $5 
million to obtain the loan, a fee equivalent 
to a 24 percent interest rate.11 From a peak 
of 2.1 million in the 1950s, population had 
dropped precipitously to the current level 
of 1.4 million.12 The city lost 80 percent of 
its manufacturing jobs, and the total 
number of jobs dropped from a high of 
800,000 to 250,000 during the same 
period. These trends have slowed, but still 
continue.13 And the economy of the greater 
Philadelphia region, while not as bleak as 
the city’s, is certainly sluggish in 
comparison to many other large 
metropolitan areas which experienced 
strong growth during the 1990s.14    
 
Philadelphia citizens and corporations bear 
one of the highest tax burdens in the 
country. City residents pay a wage tax just 
below five percent and most city leaders 
attribute the city’s loss of jobs as well as 
population largely to the wage tax. For 
their part, corporations pay a business 
privilege tax that taxes both the net 
                                                          
11 M. de Courcy Hinds, “A $150 million loan buys 
Philadelphia some time,” The New York Times (1991, 
January 6), p. 14. 
 
12 Metropolitan Philadelphia Policy Center, Flight (or) 
fight: Metropolitan Philadelphia and its future. 
Philadelphia: Author, 2001. 
 
13 Ibid. 
 
14 Ibid. 
income of a business and its gross receipts. 
(This means that the city is taxing a 
business whether it shows a profit or not.) 
In 1998, Philadelphia was judged as having 
the highest business tax burden in the 
country.15 One reason for this devastating 
tax burden is that the city is co-terminus 
with the county which means that residents 
must bear the full weight of paying for 
county as well as city services. A second 
reason is that the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania is a “low tax state” and its aid 
to cities is also low. The taxing dilemma has 
been termed the Gordian Knot, “not 
amenable to unraveling even with the best 
of intentions and considerable resources.”16   
 
During his eight-year tenure, which began 
in 1992, Mayor Ed Rendell brought 
Philadelphia back from financial collapse, 
creating a small budget surplus before he 
left office in 2000.17 His tough stance 
during a strike of city workers early in his 
administration won accolades from the 
business community, as the city ultimately 
negotiated more discretion for 
management. Democrat Rendell worked 
with Republican state officials to bring jobs 
to Philadelphia, and by 1997 the local 
economy showed a mild upswing, with a 
                                                          
15 B.J. Whiting, Philadelphia: Prospects and 
challenges at the end of the decade. (Report to the 
Pew Charitable Trusts, 1999.) 
 
16 Ibid, p. 29. 
 
17 The Mayor even succeeded in making 
Philadelphians proud of their city again. (This was no 
easy feat, given the image Philadelphia conjured up 
for many Americans — an entire city block in flames 
after Mayor Wilson Goode and his managing director 
dropped a bomb on the headquarters of the radical 
group MOVE.) Putting tourism at the center of 
Philadelphia’s economic renewal, Rendell 
flamboyantly promoted “the city that loves you 
back.” Perhaps the city and Rendell’s greatest 
accomplishment, at least symbolically, was attracting 
the Republican National Convention — an irony 
given that by the time of the convention, in August 
2000, Rendell, no longer mayor, was the Democratic 
National Committee Chair.  
T
12 Civic Engagement and Urban School Improvement: Hard-to-Learn Lessons from Philadelphia 
 
 
net gain in jobs that reversed a trend of 
several decades.18  
 
However, the financial picture of the 
Philadelphia School District worsened 
during this period because the state froze 
its formula for providing funds to local 
districts in 1993. The formula takes into 
account the number of pupils, the special 
needs of the District, its ability to raise local 
taxes, and other factors. After 1993, state 
aid to the District no longer rose in 
response to increases in enrollment. On a 
per-pupil basis adjusted for inflation, the 
real value of state education funds coming 
to Philadelphia actually decreased by 5.9 
percent between 1993 and 1998.19 
 
During Children Achieving, the School 
District’s per-pupil spending was well 
below what was being spent by districts in 
surrounding counties, by as much as $5,443 
per student.20 Teacher salaries were also 
higher in suburban schools. Average 
starting salaries in the suburbs were over 
$3,500 higher than starting salaries in 
Philadelphia and maximum salaries were 
over $9,000 higher.21   
 
Philadelphia’s Board of Education had the 
responsibility for setting policy and 
spending priorities, but it had no taxing 
power. City Council levies taxes.22 Under 
                                                          
18 N. Lemann, “No man’s town: The good times are 
killing off America’s local elites.” The New Yorker 
(2000, June 5), pp. 22-28. 
 
19 J. Century, A citizen’s guide to the Philadelphia 
school budget. Philadelphia: Greater Philadelphia 
First, 1998. 
 
20 School District of Philadelphia, Realities converge, 
revisited: School district sees gains on test scores 
and management efficiencies, but fiscal crisis is at 
hand. Philadelphia: Author, 1998, p. 11. 
 
21 Ibid, p. 29. 
 
22 Until January 2001, the Mayor was not able to 
appoint the entire Board when he assumed office, 
which diluted the accountability of the Board to the 
Mayor. But in the November 2000 election, 
these circumstances, it’s not surprising that 
when Superintendent Hornbeck went to 
the Mayor and City Council for increased 
funding for schools, they were resistant. 
Neither was willing to risk the financial 
jeopardy or political heat that increased 
city taxes to fund the schools would 
generate. Their response was that the city 
had “stretched its taxing ability to the 
limit” and they refused to provide 
significant additional resources for Children 
Achieving.23 By 1997, the Superintendent, 
the Board of Education, the City Council, 
and the Mayor were all looking to the state 
to solve the District’s fiscal problems. They 
were in agreement that the state was 
failing to provide a fair share of the costs of 
educating Philadelphia’s students.  
 
THE SCHOOLS 
 
Superintendent Hornbeck inherited a 
stable, but poorly performing school 
system. Unlike some other American cities 
where graft and patronage have made 
public schooling a disreputable enterprise, 
the District was seen as honest, but failing. 
A special section of the Philadelphia 
Inquirer published in 1994 — the summer 
of Hornbeck’s arrival — painted a dismal 
portrait of student achievement in the city’s 
schools. According to the Inquirer:  
 
• Over half of the city’s public school 
students were failing to master basic 
skills. Fifty-one percent failed the state 
reading test as compared to 13 percent 
statewide, and 50 percent failed the 
state math test as compared to 14 
percent statewide. Seventy percent of 
African Americans and 75 percent of 
Latinos failed one or both parts of the 
state test. 
                                                                                       
Philadelphia citizens voted to change the city charter 
so that the Mayor would have the authority to 
appoint all Board members at one time and to 
remove Board members at his/her discretion.  
 
23 School District of Philadelphia, Realities converge, 
revisited, p. 11. 
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• Forty-nine percent of ninth-graders 
failed to earn promotion to the tenth 
grade. 
 
• On any given day, one in four students 
was absent from class, and in the 
average year, nearly one in four 
students was suspended from school.24 
 
Corporate and civic leaders were 
disappointed in student performance and 
disillusioned with local District leadership. 
Constance Clayton had served as the first 
African American and first female 
superintendent from 1980 to 1992. When 
Clayton assumed the District helm, she 
faced a system deeply wounded by bitter 
union strikes and in financial crisis. She 
made labor peace and financial stability the 
first order of business in her plan to 
improve public education, and to her 
credit, was successful in these areas.   
 
Clayton’s education reforms included a 
Standardized Curriculum that offered an 
academic scope and sequence for all 
grades and subject areas. A citywide 
testing program aligned test items with 
discrete curriculum objectives and 
provided schools with a tool to monitor 
student progress toward achievement 
goals specified in their School 
Improvement Plan. Unfortunately, her 
strategy for improving the academic 
achievement of students produced 
disappointing results.  
 
Under Clayton, the private sector increased 
its investment in public education. Higher 
education, foundations, and private sector 
partners created PATHS/PRISM, the 
precursor to the Philadelphia Education 
Fund, which aimed to professionalize 
teaching through professional 
development activities and mini-grants for 
classroom teachers. Philadelphia was 
nationally known for its strong teacher 
                                                          
24 “A district in distress,” Philadelphia Inquirer (1994, 
October 23). 
networks, including the Philadelphia 
Writing Project, the Math Congress, and 
the Teachers’ Learning Cooperative, that 
had been nurtured by PATHS/PRISM.25    
 
In 1986, the Pew Charitable Trusts made a 
groundbreaking $13 million grant to 
establish the Philadelphia Schools 
Collaborative, which aimed to radically 
restructure Philadelphia’s neighborhood 
high schools. The Collaborative crafted a 
strategy that restructured large, alienating 
high schools into campuses of small 
learning communities. It also pressed the 
District to pursue new school governance 
structures, including site-based councils 
and “experimental status” which allowed 
exemptions from labor and state 
regulations in schools in which 75 percent 
of staff voted to adopt innovations. But 
both PATHS/PRISM and the Collaborative 
brushed up against District bureaucracy 
and the Philadelphia Federation of 
Teachers in the bid to gain autonomy for 
the new small learning communities. For 
civic leaders, particularly foundation staff, 
these contentious public encounters 
highlighted the system’s resistance to 
change and the barriers to reform posed 
by the teachers’ contract.     
 
Civic elites believed that Clayton had 
sought their support, but not their input on 
matters of substance. They were 
disillusioned with a District administration 
that was not forthcoming with data on 
whether students were actually making 
progress.26 City and civic leaders seized 
Clayton’s retirement as the moment to 
influence the direction of Philadelphia 
public education. They established the 
Partnership for Public Education, which 
worked with the Mayor and Board of 
Education to recruit a superintendent who 
                                                          
25 E. Useem, J. Culbertson, and J. Buchanan, The 
contributions of teacher networks to Philadelphia’s 
school reform. Philadelphia: Philadelphia Education 
Fund, 1997. 
 
26 Business leader, October 2000. 
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would put accountability for results at the 
center of the District reform agenda. By 
this time, the Pew Charitable Trusts had 
assumed a prominent role in the national 
standards movement and staff there hoped 
to recruit a leader committed to that brand 
of reform.   
 
CIVIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
COMMUNITY GROUPS 
 
A study of Philadelphia’s prospects and 
challenges commissioned by the Pew 
Charitable Trusts in the 1990s 
characterized the city’s civic leadership as 
“disengaged” and as having a “pervasive, 
defeatist mentality.”27 Despite Mayor Ed 
Rendell’s cheerleading for city 
improvements, civic institutions and leaders 
did not develop a “can do” spirit and 
efforts at rallying together to solve a 
particular issue were limited. Community 
development corporations were weak 
when Superintendent Hornbeck arrived 
and, while there were a few examples of 
effective neighborhood and grassroots 
organizing, they remained isolated and 
were not directed at public education.       
 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE 
SCHOOLS 
 
The vulnerability of the city’s small 
economic gains during the 1990s was 
prominent in our interviews. In response to 
the question, “What do you view as the 
three greatest challenges to 
Philadelphia?”, informants almost 
universally named economic decline and a 
desperately inadequate public school 
system. Our respondents saw the state of 
the schools and the state of the city, 
especially the city’s economy, as tightly 
linked, but they presented varying views on 
the lines of causality. Respondents also 
                                                          
27 Whiting, Philadelphia: Prospects and challenges at 
the end of the decade, p. 22. 
focused on different consequences of the 
school system’s inadequacies.   
 
All of the people with whom we spoke 
expressed grave concerns about the city’s 
economic viability. Many implicated the 
schools in the city’s decline. Some blamed 
schools for the flight of the middle class 
and the ensuing erosion of the tax base: 
 
Public education is central to improving the 
city. The issues that we hear about from 
the neighborhoods are safety and schools. 
Schools are the biggest reason that people 
leave the city. Myself included.28 
 
The poor quality of education is certainly at 
the top of my list. And then there are the 
consequences from that — the loss of an 
employment base, the high tax structure 
compared to the suburbs, and the fact that 
people don’t want to stay in the city.29 
 
Others criticized schools for churning out 
students who were not prepared for 
employment. They saw the school system 
as responsible for a poorly educated 
workforce that discouraged corporations 
from remaining in Philadelphia or choosing 
to locate here: 
 
I’ve been involved in trying to get big 
technology to the city. And it’s not 
happening. The wage tax is not the 
deciding factor. Workforce preparedness is 
the biggest concern. And these folks are 
not looking for high-end employees. These 
are basic, entry-level jobs. They just want 
people who will be responsible, stick 
around, and learn something.30 
 
Prospective employers are concerned with 
the lack of talent in the city.31 
                                                          
28 Media leader, April 2000. 
 
29 Civic leader, March 2000.  
 
30 Media leader, April 2000. 
 
31 Civic leader, January 2001. 
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In summary, these interviewees stressed 
the need to attract and hold businesses if 
the city was going to establish a viable tax 
base. From their viewpoint, Philadelphia’s 
economic recovery hinged on the schools’ 
capacity to produce an adequate workforce 
and attract middle- and working-class 
families. More and better jobs would 
encourage middle- and working-class 
families to live in and contribute to the 
city’s prosperity through their taxes, 
consumer spending, and housing 
investments. But the city could compete for 
these new residents only if there were 
good public schools for their children.   
 
It is only a small overstatement to say that 
these interviewees laid Philadelphia’s 
decline at the feet of its school system. Is 
this a fair analysis? We have already noted 
the negative impact of high taxes on 
working- and middle-class residents. In 
addition, while it is true that many of the 
middle-class Philadelphia residents recently 
relocated city cite poor public schools as a 
factor in their decision to leave, the trend 
of suburbanization began in the early 
twentieth century as result of federal 
housing and highway policies, 
discriminatory bank lending for housing, 
and flight from the influx of poor 
immigrants.32 Further, it is impossible to 
talk about suburbanization without 
situating it within a history of race relations 
in the U.S. At times explicitly, and always 
implicitly, the suburbs have been identified 
as a place for White families.   
 
Grassroots civic leaders and School Board 
members painted a more complex picture 
                                                          
32 K. Jackson, Crabgrass frontier: The suburbanization 
of the United States. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985. In his analysis of federal housing policies 
over the past century, Jackson asserts that federal 
housing policies, the development of the modern 
transportation system, and the relocation of major 
corporate centers from urban to suburban areas have 
been the real culprits. He concludes that the basic 
direction of federal policies toward housing has been 
concentration of the poor in the central city and the 
dispersal of the affluent to the suburbs.  
of the relationship between public schools 
and the city economy. They saw the two in 
a cruel and mutually reinforcing dynamic. 
Often they focused on the city’s existing 
residents and the lack of economic 
opportunities for them: 
 
We’re in a vicious cycle. We have a 
declining tax base, so the city is less able to 
provide the services people expect, so 
people leave. And then you have the 
neediest people remaining in the city. So 
the challenge is restoring opportunity for 
people to earn a living, raise a family with 
the expectation that the next generation 
will do better. We need a stronger 
economy and that is tied to the education 
system.33 
 
Some leaders were angry that schools bore 
the blame for deep-seated social ills and 
resented what they perceived as unrealistic 
expectations for public education: 
 
[Public education] has become the flash 
point for societal concerns like race and 
class. We think we just need to come up 
with the right education plan and then we 
can make public education [and society] 
work. This is simplistic.34 
 
Clearly, Philadelphia’s leaders offered 
contrasting ideas about what it would take 
to strengthen the city and what the public 
could expect schools to do in that effort. 
Their varying analyses of urban problems 
and the role of public education 
foreshadowed the different criteria by 
which they would judge any educational 
reform. Some judged reform on its ability 
to hold middle-class families with school-
age children in the city; others judged the 
system’s ability to positively impact the life 
chances of those it has consistently failed 
— poor children of color.  
  
                                                          
33 School Board member, March 2000. 
 
34 Civic leader, May 2000. 
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POWERFUL MESSAGES 
WITH MANY 
INTERPRETATIONS 
 
uperintendent David Hornbeck’s 
plan for improving Philadelphia’s 
schools, Children Achieving, was a 
reform agenda with powerful ideas, 
ambitious goals, and broad scope. 
Hornbeck had strong beliefs about what 
public schools could and should do. He was 
passionate in his assertions that: “Results 
matter. It’s not enough to work hard,” “All 
children can achieve at high levels,” and 
“Adults’ expectations of students have 
been too low and this has contributed to 
the consistently low achievement levels in 
our schools.”35 Hornbeck pledged that 
every student would achieve proficiency in 
three core subject areas (math, reading, 
and science) by 2008. In laying out his plan, 
the new superintendent argued that 
previous attempts at reforms had failed 
because they were too incremental, too 
narrowly framed, and did not attempt to 
alter the “system” itself. He believed that a 
more comprehensive strategy was 
necessary — one that changed all parts of 
the system all at once. Superintendent 
Hornbeck identified 10 reform components 
which were necessary in order for 
Philadelphia schools to meet the new 
ambitious student performance goals (see 
Sidebar 2 on page 18). Hornbeck’s 
message was powerful and resonated with 
a community eager for change.   
 
The language describing the reform 
components, however, was abstract and 
laden with educational terms unfamiliar to 
most people and open to many 
interpretations. The critical levers for 
change in Children Achieving were 
standards, accountability, and 
decentralization. Based on the Children 
Achieving Action Design, District leaders 
                                                          
35 Excerpts from speeches by the Superintendent. 
began restructuring the system in line with 
the major ideas of the reform. Educators 
and parents, and community members 
developed content standards to guide 
curriculum and instruction by establishing 
what students should know and be able to 
do. Central administrators set targets for 
schools and monitored their students’ 
progress on indicators such as standardized 
test scores, attendance, and promotion 
and graduation rates which comprised the 
District’s Performance Responsibility Index 
(PRI). The District offered rewards and 
sanctions to school staffs based on their 
schools’ progress toward meeting their 
targets. The District was divided into 22 
neighborhood clusters, each serving a 
comprehensive high school and its feeder 
elementary and middle schools. Cluster 
offices were established to offer guidance 
and support to their schools. In turn, 
schools were reorganized into small 
learning communities composed of 250-
400 students and their teachers. Small 
learning communities were designed to 
offer more personalized teaching and 
learning environments and to customize 
curriculum and instruction to meet the 
needs of their students. Schools were 
encouraged to create local school councils 
of teachers, parents, and administrators to 
set school policies. 
 
The District established a system of 
supports to help schools meet their 
performance targets. These included: 
clusters, as described above; the 
Curriculum Frameworks, to give more 
guidance to teachers in how to implement 
the new standards; the Teaching and 
Learning Network, to provide direct 
support (i.e., professional development, 
advice on how to implement new District 
policies) to schools and teachers; and the 
Family Resource Network, to coordinate 
the many “safety net” human services 
supports that so many poor children need. 
 
 
S
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SIDEBAR 2. THE CHILDREN ACHIEVING 10-POINT ACTION DESIGN 
 
 
In 1995, the District released the Children Achieving Action Design in which it articulated 10 
reform components necessary to achieve its goals. The following are excerpts from District 
documents and the Superintendent’s speeches that enumerate these 10 components: 
 
• We must behave as if we believe that all students will learn at high levels. 
 
• Standards-based reform will drive the system…We must set standards, have new 
assessment strategies, and develop new incentive systems for both adults and students. 
 
• Decisions will be made at the school level…Authority for decisions about personnel, 
budget, professional development, instructional strategies and curriculum, scheduling, 
student and teacher assignments inside of a school, and, perhaps, discipline, should be 
made at the school level…In addition to school employees, parents must also be partners in 
making those decisions. 
 
• Staff development is critical to improved performance. 
 
• Early childhood support is less expensive and more effective…There are at least three areas 
of focus important to school readiness: supports for families; health and social services; and 
full-day kindergarten, pre-kindergarten, and childcare. 
 
• Community services and supports can make the difference between success and failure. 
Children who are unhealthy, hungry, abused, ill-housed, ill-clothed, or otherwise face the 
kinds of problems outside of the school borne of poverty cannot achieve at high levels. 
 
• Adequate technology, instructional materials, and facilities are necessary to learning. 
 
• Strong public engagement is required. Unless parents, civic leaders, elected officials, the 
business community, postsecondary educators, and the wider citizenry understand and 
support radical change, we cannot sustain it. 
 
• We must have adequate resources and use them effectively. 
 
• We must do all of these nine components. The agenda is not a pick-and-choose menu. We 
must approach the challenge of education reform in a comprehensive and integrated way. If 
one or more features of the whole agenda is not implemented, its power to yield high 
performance by all students will be significantly diminished.36  
 
 
 
                                                          
36 School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving strategic action design. 
 
THE CHILDREN ACHIEVING 
PLAN: “COMPREHENSIVE” AND 
“COMMON SENSE” 
 
When our informants discussed Children 
Achieving, it was not in terms of specific 
initiatives or components such as clusters, 
small learning communities, or the new 
standardized assessments, but in terms of 
its broad approach to educational 
improvement. Interviewees, whether from 
business, government, civic institutions, 
grassroots groups, higher education, or the 
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media, portrayed the plan as 
“comprehensive” and “complex.” They 
often recited Hornbeck’s admonition that 
“it was not a pick-and-choose agenda” and 
that changes must occur throughout the 
system all at once. And perhaps most 
tellingly, they explained that Children 
Achieving was “common sense.” 
   
It’s a complex agenda built on simple ideas 
about schools. The premise is that you 
can’t do just one, two, three things — you 
need to do it all.37 
 
Children Achieving was a logical 
document.38 
 
Children Achieving is a lot of common 
sense ideas — it’s not some new brilliant 
program.39 
 
Educators have been trying to do the 
things that Children Achieving talks about 
for years.40 
 
Our participants lauded Children Achieving 
for its logic. And they noted that its ideas 
were not new. However, as we will show, 
this broad view of Children Achieving 
masked significant differences in 
understanding of the reforms.   
 
Of all the sectors included in our sample, 
leaders of civic institutions offered the 
most praise for the Children Achieving 
reform plan. They expressed pride and 
gratitude that Philadelphia had a plan — 
something they saw that other cities 
lacked.   
 
David did Philadelphia the favor of showing 
up with a concerted agenda that 
                                                          
37 Foundation leader, October 2000. 
 
38 Civic leader, August 2000. 
 
39 Former School Board member, October 2000. 
 
40 School District staff member, May 2000. 
established the idea that children can 
achieve.41 
 
When I look at other urban school districts, 
I see that in many ways we’re lucky. We 
have a strong reform plan.42  
 
We have something to build on, but we 
have to remember that it takes a long time.  
What’s positive is the amount of work 
being done, the focus on high expectations 
and changing practice, professional 
development, and involving the community 
in schools.43   
 
Civic leaders saw the plan as a foundation 
on which to build, the strongest legacy of 
the Children Achieving era.    
 
Accountability was the most frequently 
mentioned characteristic of the reform by 
participants across all sectors. For the 
majority of our participants, the 
accountability system was not only the 
clearest aspect of the reform, it was also 
the most important — the driver of 
everything else. A few, such as the business 
leader below, considered accountability 
the reform itself and criticized Hornbeck for 
complicating a straightforward message 
and losing the focus necessary to achieve 
results.  
 
Children Achieving was all about 
accountability. He [Hornbeck] made it 
complicated with the 10 points. He could 
have made it much more simple by 
focusing on the accountability piece. The 
loss of that was the loss of the message.44    
 
The second most often-mentioned 
characteristic of Children Achieving was its 
emphasis on the idea that all children can 
                                                          
41 Government leader, March 2000. 
 
42 Civic leader, February 2000. 
 
43 Civic leader, March 2000. 
 
44 Business leader, November 2000. 
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achieve and participants linked this idea 
closely to Hornbeck as an individual.   
 
The best thing that David did was 
convincing people that every child can 
actually learn.45 
 
[Children Achieving’s goal] has been to 
change the mindset about what we can do 
to make sure kids learn. The basic tenet is 
that all children can learn and I think he’s 
[Hornbeck] so right about that.46 
 
Although the vast majority of the people 
we talked to commended the ideas of the 
reform plan, there were a few exceptions. 
These participants argued that while the 
rhetoric of Children Achieving was 
seductive, the plan was unrealistic. A labor 
leader argued that it did not address the 
realities of schools, particularly schools’ 
lack of resources for meeting the many 
needs of poor urban students: 
 
How can you argue against Children 
Achieving? You can’t. It’s like Bambi. But 
you have to look at the reality.47 
 
A government leader who supported 
school choice as a solution to the problems 
of the schools said: 
 
Children Achieving does not have meaning 
to the customer. What is Children 
Achieving? Is it reading, writing, and math? 
Children Achieving is a phrase to use as an 
organizing tool for marketing. It’s a feel-
good-about-the-system ploy.48 
 
On the surface, almost all of our 
interviewees accepted Children Achieving’s 
major premises. However this apparent 
unity of belief was deceptive. When we 
                                                          
45 Civic leader, August 2000. 
 
46 Foundation leader, January 2000. 
 
47 Labor leader, August 2000.  
 
48 Government leader, October 2000. 
probed their views of Children Achieving 
more deeply, it became apparent that 
there were competing understandings of 
the major ideas underlying the reform — 
particularly standards, accountability, and 
decentralization.  
 
MULTIPLE INTERPRETATIONS 
OF CHILDREN ACHIEVING  
 
A theory of action is the set of assumptions 
and beliefs that reform leaders hold about 
how their efforts that will work together to 
cause desired improvements. We have 
described Children Achieving’s theory of 
action as follows: 
 
If the central administration works with the 
schools and the community to set high 
academic standards for student 
achievement; aligns assessment with those 
standards; establishes an accountability 
system that offers strong incentives; 
delegates more authority over school 
resources, organization, policies, and 
programs to the schools; monitors equity 
throughout the organization; and builds 
public understanding and support for 
reform; and if central administration and 
cluster staff provide guidance and high-
quality support to schools and small 
learning communities, then the teachers 
and administrators of the Philadelphia 
schools, in consultation with their 
communities, will customize instructional 
technologies and patterns of behavior that 
will help all children reach high standards.49  
  
Did Philadelphia’s leaders subscribe to this 
theory of action? Did they understand it? 
No matter how strong the educational 
improvement plan or how visionary the 
district leadership, there must be sustained 
                                                          
49 Consortium for Policy Research in Education, 
Research for Action, and the OMG Center for 
Collaborative Learning, A first-year evaluation report 
of Children Achieving: Philadelphia’s education 
reform. Philadelphia: Greater Philadelphia First, 
1996.  
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support from civic elites and ordinary 
citizens in order for reform strategies to 
take hold and spread in urban schools. In 
addition to educational bureaucracy and 
human resistance to change, contentious 
politics and scarce resources have 
consistently undermined full 
implementation of reform ideas and plans.50 
Coalitions of support and institutional 
alliances are necessary. What does it take 
to create such coalitions and partnerships? 
 
In their analysis of the Chicago reform, 
Shipps, Sconzert, and Swyers argue that 
reform leaders must understand the 
perspectives of local constituencies so that 
their reforms will gain legitimacy in the 
community. Such understanding helps 
reform leaders craft approaches to 
improvement or theories of action that 
make sense to local stakeholders.51 It also 
helps reform leaders anticipate when they 
will need to compromise in order to gain 
broader support and build ownership. Like 
Hill, Campbell, and Harvey,52 Shipps, 
Sconzert, and Swyers  also argue that 
reform approaches need to be flexible. In 
their view, no one strategy is likely to 
transform schools and improve student 
learning by itself. “Hybrid” reforms are 
more promising. They are also more likely 
to appeal to wide range of constituencies, 
especially if they emerge from ongoing 
discussions of reform ideas and revisions to 
original plans when necessary.     
 
Lingard and his colleagues offer another 
perspective on reform strategies. They 
point out that too often reforms are 
discarded without an understanding of 
what ideas actually succeeded or failed. 
                                                          
50 K.A. McDermott, “Barriers to large-scale success of 
models for urban school reform.” Educational 
Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 22 (2000), pp. 83-89. 
 
51 D. Shipps, K. Sconzert, and H. Swyers, The Chicago 
Annenberg Challenge: The first three years. Chicago: 
Consortium on Chicago School Research, 1999. 
 
52 Hill, Campbell, and Harvey, It takes a city. 
They argue that any single theory of 
improvement often contains competing 
concepts that are lost in the often-abstract 
language of school reform.53 They show 
how particular reform ideas, in their case, 
“school-based management,” far from 
being a consistently understood and 
unified theory of change, are often 
politically contested and have competing 
meanings. Recent research on the 
standards movement in the United States 
has supported this.54 It has pointed to the 
varying interpretations of “standards” and 
the very different implications that each of 
these interpretations carries for such 
educational practices as assessment of 
student learning (standardized tests versus 
performance-based assessment) and 
pedagogy (scripted lessons that develop 
students’ basic skills versus constructivist 
teaching and learning that values inquiry 
and meaning making).   
 
In the following discussion, we show that 
there were competing interpretations of 
the ideas underlying Children Achieving. 
Our interviewees read the abstract ideas of 
standards, accountability, and 
decentralization through the lens of their 
own theories of how to improve public 
education. In other words, they heard what 
they wanted and expected to hear from 
the perspective of their personal theories 
about what actions would improve public 
education.  
 
We asked leaders what they perceived to 
be the successes and failures of the reform, 
what they thought ought to be continued, 
and what changes they believed were 
                                                          
53 B. Lingard, D. Hayes, and M. Mills, “Developments 
in school-based management: The specific case of 
Queensland, Australia.” Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the American Education Research 
Association, New Orleans, LA, April 2000. 
 
54 S. Thompson, “The authentic standards movement 
and its evil twin.” Phi Delta Kappan, 82(5), pp. 358-
362. 
 
22 Civic Engagement and Urban School Improvement: Hard-to-Learn Lessons from Philadelphia 
 
 
necessary to improve schools and student 
achievement in the future. From their 
responses, we discerned five theories of 
action which we have named: managerial, 
redistribution of resources, democratic 
revitalization, teaching and learning, and 
market.55 It should be noted that few 
participants spoke from only one theory of 
action. Most drew from multiple theories of 
action in their articulations of the problems 
facing schools and what needed to be 
done; sometimes there were contradictory 
theories operating at the same time in their 
accounts.  
 
There were, however, some broad patterns 
of similarity among participants within 
sectors. Business and political leaders 
focused on the need for a strong 
managerial model. Some combined this 
with a market approach, describing school 
choice as the most logical and powerful 
solution to a poorly performing school 
system. Grassroots leaders and civic 
leaders, Children Achieving Challenge staff, 
and District employees saw economic 
inequality and racial discrimination as the 
most significant issues confronting schools 
(and the broader society). They called for a 
redistribution of resources that would 
provide students from groups who have 
traditionally performed poorly with the 
better-designed and more intensive 
supports needed to ensure their school 
success. Grassroots, civic, and foundation 
leaders were also likely to call for increased 
public engagement, thereby voicing the 
values of democratic revitalization. Higher 
education, civic, and foundation leaders 
focused on teaching and learning as the 
pathway to improving student 
performance.  
 
Below we examine these five theories of 
action. We describe how each theory 
framed the major problems of the city’s 
                                                          
55 Some of these theories are drawn from the work of 
Shipps, Sconzert, and Swyers (see footnote 51), and 
Lingard, Hayes, and Mills (see footnote 53). 
schools and the solutions it offered to 
those problems. We also identify the 
interpretations each theory offered for the 
important ideas of Children Achieving — 
standards, accountability, and 
decentralization.  
 
MANAGERIAL  
 
Participants from the business and 
government sectors were most likely to 
view Children Achieving from a managerial 
perspective. From this perspective, low 
student achievement is seen as the result of 
weak efforts by adults and students. 
Managerialists advocate for outcomes-
based reforms and a system of incentives 
and sanctions to encourage school staff 
and students to ratchet up their 
performance. The role of central 
administrators is to set clear performance 
targets and then give school-level 
administrators the authority to decide how 
to meet those targets. The purpose of 
decentralization is to give discretion to 
school staff so that professional autonomy 
is commensurate with accountability. So, 
for example, the managerial approach 
would not use decentralization as a means 
to increase the role of parents in school 
decision-making, but as a means to 
increase the responsibility of school staff to 
solve students’ educational problems. 
What is important are clear accountability 
targets, therefore standards need to be 
precise. In this theory of action, there is 
little concern that standardized tests will 
narrow curriculum and instruction. 
 
Those of our participants who spoke from 
this theory of action often wanted District 
leaders to be political pragmatists who 
“could get the job done;” they wanted 
principals to have authority to hire staff and 
more discretion over teachers’ time; they 
wanted the teachers’ union to make 
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TABLE 1. COMPETING THEORIES OF ACTION 
 
Theory of Action Problem Definition Action Plan Purpose of Standards Lines of Accountability  
 
Roles in a Decentralized 
System 
Systemic Reform 
(Hornbeck) 
Guidance for 
educational 
improvement from a 
distance through 
alignment of policies, 
resources, and 
incentives. 
Lack of alignment of 
policies has created 
fragmentation and 
incoherence. Lack of 
accountability for 
performance.   
Establish standards, monitor 
progress, and offer 
incentives for performance. 
Align policies and 
resources. Build capacity 
through professional 
development. 
Standards are 
important because they 
offer direction for 
aligning curriculum, 
assessment, allocation 
of resources, and 
professional 
development.   
Lines for accountability 
follow district organizational 
chart. Public reporting of 
data on schools’ progress 
toward performance targets 
also makes educators 
accountable to community 
stakeholders.    
Central office sets 
targets for schools, 
monitors students’ 
progress, and offers 
rewards or sanctions to 
frontline educators 
based on performance.  
Authority for decisions 
about personnel, 
budget, instructional 
strategies, and 
curriculum belong to 
schools. 
Managerial 
(Business and 
government leaders) 
Frontline managers are 
accountable for student 
performance with 
concomitant discretion 
over decision-making.   
Lack of accountability for 
results. Centralized 
bureaucracy and teacher 
contract are impediments to 
frontline managers 
(principals).  
Set clear targets for 
performance and hold 
everyone accountable for 
results. Give frontline 
managers more discretion 
over work rules, resources, 
etc. Build capacity of 
frontline managers. 
Standards are 
important because they 
offer clear targets for 
performance and are 
the basis for a system 
of rewards and 
sanctions. With clear 
targets, educators and 
students will ratchet up 
their performance.  
Lines for accountability 
follow the district 
organizational chart; 
employees are responsible 
to their supervisor.  
Central administration 
sets clear targets for 
performance. Frontline 
managers have broad 
discretion for hiring staff, 
allocating resources, and 
customizing the 
educational program to 
fit local context.   
Redistribution of 
Resources  
(Grassroots leaders, 
Children Achieving 
Challenge staff, and 
District employees)  
Reallocate resources so 
that students who have 
traditionally performed 
poorly receive the 
supports they need to 
meet rigorous 
standards.  
Economic and racial 
inequality. Insufficient 
resources devoted to 
support all students in 
reaching rigorous 
standards.    
Generate public discussion 
about root causes of 
inequality and build 
consensus about strategies 
for addressing them. 
Mobilize resources from 
federal, state, and city 
governments, and private 
sources.   
Standards are 
important because they 
leverage socially 
equitable student 
outcomes. All students, 
regardless of their race, 
class, and gender, will 
have access to a 
rigorous curriculum and 
the supports necessary 
to meet new 
requirements. 
Lines for accountability 
follow the district 
organizational chart. When 
combined with democratic 
revitalization, community 
stakeholders play an 
important role in 
accountability.   
Central office sets 
standards and monitors 
performance. Authority 
for decisions about 
educational program can 
be made at any level, 
but the central office 
must play a vigilant role 
in monitoring the 
equitable distribution of 
resources. When 
combined with 
democratic revitalization, 
community stakeholders 
play an important role in 
monitoring equity. 
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TABLE 1. COMPETING THEORIES OF ACTION (CONTINUED) 
 
Theory of Action Problem Definition Action Plan Purpose of Standards Lines of Accountability  
 
Roles in a Decentralized 
System 
Democratic 
Revitalization 
(Civic, foundation, and 
grassroots leaders) 
Reform plan emerges 
from a broad public 
dialogue about 
purposes of education. 
Schools controlled by 
educational bureaucracy 
that is resistant to input of 
parents and community 
members. Lack of a broad 
public dialogue on the 
purposes of schools. 
Promote public dialogue 
about purposes of 
education. Make 
information about schools 
readily accessible to public 
and create many avenues 
for civic engagement in 
schools. Make local school 
councils authentic sites for 
community participation in 
decisions. 
Standards are 
important because they 
offer the opportunity 
for community 
stakeholders to 
articulate what they 
want their students to 
learn.     
Educators are accountable 
to their community 
stakeholders. 
Local community 
members play the key 
role in hiring school 
management, setting 
local school policy and 
monitoring outcomes. 
Teaching and Learning 
(Higher education, 
foundation, and civic 
leaders)  
Invigorate curriculum 
and instruction to 
emphasize critical 
thinking. Invest in 
professional 
development for 
educators.  
Insufficient attention to 
curriculum and instruction, 
the development of school 
leaders, and the ongoing 
learning of teachers.     
Invest in professional 
development for principals, 
teachers, and support 
personnel. Seek out and/or 
develop high-quality, 
rigorous curriculum. Provide 
many support services for 
students who need help 
reaching high standards. 
Standards are 
important because they 
offer a framework for 
curriculum develop-
ment and imply an 
instructional approach.  
Educators are accountable 
to their colleagues for 
continuing to grow 
professionally, participating 
in school decision-making, 
and for student learning. 
School staff who share a 
common mission and 
pedagogical approach 
customize an 
educational program for 
their students.  
Market 
(Business and 
government leaders) 
Place schools under 
market conditions so 
that parents can choose 
the best school for their 
children.  
System lacks choice, 
competition, and 
entrepreneurship.   
Create many educational 
options and give parents 
the resources to choose 
what is appropriate for their 
children.      
Parents use their own 
standards to select 
schools for their 
children. 
Parents hold schools 
accountable through choice.   
Educators (program 
developers, vendors) 
select the educational 
model for their schools.  
The degree of parent 
involvement in this 
process depends on the 
model. 
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concessions to management about the role 
of seniority in job assignments and about 
work conditions in exchange for increases 
in compensation. One of our interviewees 
crystallized the managerial theory of action. 
Some of his comments included: 
 
Children Achieving was all about 
accountability.  
 
He [the Superintendent] was a missionary in 
the way he was so fervent in his approach. 
You have to be practical to get things done 
sometimes. 
 
The [teachers’] contract is a big burden. It’s 
all the work rules, the crazy work rules.56 
 
REDISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES 
 
Grassroots civic leaders, Children 
Achieving Challenge staff, and District 
employees were advocates for 
redistributing resources. In this theory of 
action, the problem of low student 
achievement in urban schools is the result 
of social injustice. Schools reflect the 
inequities of the broader society and 
reproduce them. Taken-for-granted 
practices, such as ability tracking, staff 
transfer, and seniority policies that assign 
the least-experienced and least-qualified 
staff to schools with the highest 
concentrations of families in poverty, are 
unfair. Increased resources distributed 
according to need are key to assuring 
equitable outcomes.   
 
The redistributing resources discourse 
about standards emphasizes the 
development of high expectations as a 
necessary precursor to achieving equitable 
student outcomes. The assumption is that 
differences in academic performance 
correlate with race and class because of 
adults’ beliefs that poor students and 
students of color cannot achieve at high 
levels. Changing adult expectations is 
                                                          
56 Business leader, November 2000. 
critical to improving student performance. 
If teachers believe that students can 
achieve at high levels, then they will teach 
an enriched and rigorous curriculum to all 
students, regardless of their race, class, 
and gender.  
 
Those advocating for a redistribution of 
resources call for a broad discussion about 
the reasons for inequities and the building 
of an advocacy base to correct them. This 
view overlaps with the Democratic 
Revitalization theory of action which also 
calls for broad public discussion about 
public education. 
 
Disaggregated data that reports outcomes 
for students by race/ethnicity, economic 
status, etc. is key to this theory of action. 
Credible information about all students’ 
learning is essential to decisions about how 
to allocate and direct supports to students 
who are not meeting standards. During 
Children Achieving, new ways of reporting 
student data brought attention to 
educational inequities and the District 
conducted a number of policy studies that 
focused on questions of equity. Proponents 
of this theory of action argue that any 
decentralization initiatives must be 
accompanied by vigilant monitoring of 
equity. During Children Achieving, reform 
leaders reflected that belief by pulling back 
from their initial decentralization of 
authority measures as they reviewed 
evidence that reforms were not closing the 
achievement gap between racial groups.57 
 
A civic leader articulated this theory of 
action: 
 
I really credit Children Achieving with 
putting the notion on the table that these 
kids should have a really good school 
system. I think being persistent about the 
                                                          
57 E. Foley, Contradictions and control in systemic 
reform: The ascendancy of the central office in 
Philadelphia schools. Philadelphia: Consortium for 
Policy Research in Education, University of 
Pennsylvania, 2001. 
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idea is good. We shouldn’t have a double 
standard for suburban and urban kids. 
Hornbeck has mounted a serious 
meaningful effort to improve the schools 
here. Before it was always less than great. 
The mentality was “we can’t do that here.” 
It’s been that way for as long as I’ve been 
around. Not building the support for the 
program is problematic. I think he has 
tried, but he could have done more. But 
then I don’t think the business community 
or the PFT [Philadelphia Federation of 
Teachers] tried to help either. This has 
been a more serious attempt to get Philly 
schools to achieve at the same level as 
suburban schools. The attitude isn’t “let’s 
do the best we can given the poor material 
we have to work with,” but let’s do it fairly 
for everyone and gradually over the long 
term.58 
 
Those who advocated for a redistribution 
of resources were more concerned that 
Philadelphia’s public schools better serve 
students of color and interrupt the cycle of 
poverty and disadvantage than that they 
strengthen the market economy, satisfy 
corporate desires for an educated 
workforce, or provide islands of 
educational excellence for middle-class 
families.   
 
Superintendent Hornbeck’s very public and 
persistent fight for fair funding marked him, 
more than any other city figure, as a leader 
of the struggle for social justice in 
education. He remained a hero to many 
grassroots leaders and parents we 
interviewed, even as support for him 
crumbled in other sectors.  
 
DEMOCRATIC REVITALIZATION 
 
Leaders from civic institutions, grassroots 
groups, and foundations were represented 
in this category. Proponents of democratic 
revitalization view centralized bureaucracy 
as the obstacle to educational renewal. 
                                                          
58 Civic leader, April 2000. 
They argue for a broad public dialogue on 
the purposes of education that would serve 
as the foundation for a covenant between a 
community and its schools. The articulation 
of standards for students’ learning is part 
of the public discussion and lays the 
groundwork for accountability of schools to 
the community. The purpose of 
decentralization is to increase 
parental/community authority in local 
school councils. Participants speaking from 
this perspective critiqued Children 
Achieving’s failure to “change power 
relationships” and to “create a public 
clamor for change.” 
 
The problem is that we made some 
structural changes but we did not change 
the power or authority relationships in 
schools and between school people and 
the community.59 
 
My main criticism about Children Achieving 
is that you can’t do this kind of reform 
without more widespread support. There 
needs to be a demand for it. There are 
other parents and community leaders who 
could support the agenda more strongly, 
but I don’t think the District tried to 
engage those people and it cost them in 
the end. You can’t have a large program 
like this without good salesmanship. I think 
that’s the crucial missing piece of this 
agenda. You can't just come up with some 
good ideas and then have quiet 
conversations with your 10 closest friends 
and expect things to change radically. It’s 
not enough. You need to create a public 
clamor for change. That just hasn’t 
happened. I don’t think the public ever 
understood much about Children 
Achieving. I think if they understood it, 
they would support it.60 
 
Public reporting of data redefines the 
relationship between the District and the 
                                                          
59 Civic leader, March 2000. 
 
60 Civic leader, April 2000. 
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community and encourages greater public 
engagement in school reform. From this 
perspective, a major accomplishment of 
Children Achieving was making data 
available for public scrutiny. The weak 
implementation of local school councils and 
lack of support for their authority was a 
major disappointment. Often the civic 
leaders calling for democratic revitalization 
also viewed inequities in the educational 
system as the root of many of its problems.  
 
TEACHING AND LEARNING 
 
Higher education leaders, civic leaders, and 
foundation staff were proponents of the 
teaching and learning theory of action. 
Supporters of this theory of action focus on 
the ongoing learning of educational 
practitioners, the professionalization of the 
teaching force, and the implementation of 
educational innovations such as whole-
school reform models as the means of 
change. Fullan has been a strong advocate 
for this theory of action. He argues that 
“changes at the bottom” are as necessary 
for systemic change as policy alignment at 
the top. He suggests two bottom-up 
strategies. One is the large-scale 
networking of schools with outside partners 
who can bring high-quality professional 
development and other resources to bear 
on the challenges of schools. And the 
second is a reculturing of schools so that 
the ongoing learning of practitioners and 
continuous improvement of practice are 
the underpinnings of school reform.61  
 
Those working from this theory of action 
look to standards to offer teachers 
guidance about what should be taught and 
how. At the same time, decentralization 
should offer school educators discretion 
over decisions about curriculum and 
instruction because they are the 
professionals and they have the most 
knowledge about their students’ needs, 
                                                          
61 M. Fullan, “Turning systemic thinking on its head,” 
Phi Delta Kappan, 77(6), pp. 420-423. 
interests, and abilities. This theory of action 
emphasizes non-hierarchical accountability. 
Strong collegial relationships among 
teachers promote a culture of collective 
responsibility for student achievement. 
 
Developing an infrastructure of expertise 
and support outside the District (higher 
education institutions, community and 
cultural organizations) that can work with 
school staff to improve teaching and 
learning is also an important component. 
From the vantage point of teaching and 
learning as a theory of action, full-day 
kindergarten and Children Achieving’s 
attention to increasing opportunities for 
professional development were major 
accomplishments. Some of the 
interviewees who supported this theory of 
action expressed disappointment that, 
despite reform leaders’ intentions, it had 
proved extremely difficult for Children 
Achieving to reach classrooms.  
 
We’re not talking about the classrooms. 
That is the hardest. The biggest 
disappointment is that we’re not paying 
attention to teachers in the classroom. We 
just do peripheral things. . .62 
 
Others believed that the reform plan was 
weak in its mechanisms for developing 
school leadership and bemoaned the 
District’s lack of investment in its frontline 
educators. 
 
David didn’t pay any attention to the 
leadership skills of principals. Imagine what 
could have happened if we had focused on 
leadership development.63 
 
MARKET  
 
The market-based theory of action asserts 
that schools will improve only if they are 
placed under market conditions, in which 
                                                          
62 Civic leader, March 2000. 
 
63 Civic leader, October 2000. 
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SIDEBAR 3. SCHOOL CHOICE AS A THEORY OF CHANGE: 
GOVERNOR RIDGE’S EDUCATION REFORM PROPOSALS 
 
 
Governor Tom Ridge’s education policy agenda differed radically from Children Achieving’s 
systemic reform approach. The theory of change underlying his reform proposals was that 
schools would only improve if they were placed under market conditions, in which parents were 
consumers and could choose what they considered to be the best school for their children. The 
exercise of choice would force ineffective schools out of business as parents moved their 
children to schools that were successful. Throughout his administration, Governor Ridge 
advocated the creation of charter schools, the institution of vouchers, and the privatization of 
school systems that were experiencing chronic and widespread failure as remedies to overcome 
entrenched bureaucracy and improve performances.  
 
Five months after taking office, Ridge proposed a statewide voucher plan, called, “Keystone 
Initiative for a Difference in Our Schools,” designed to provide “educational opportunity 
grants” to families throughout Pennsylvania. The opportunity grants, or vouchers, could be used 
at private, religious, or out-of-district public schools. They would initially go to families making 
$15,000 or less a year and eventually to families making $70,000 or less. If the plan had been 
adopted, 52,000 students would have been eligible in the first year, more than half of them 
residing in Philadelphia. Shortly after its introduction, the bill was rejected in the House by 
seven votes.   
 
Ridge’s second effort to promote vouchers was in spring of 1999. He introduced another 
statewide plan, called the Academic Recovery Act, designed to provide “super-vouchers” to 
students in the most academically troubled school districts. He wrote $63 million into the state 
budget to pay for a statewide pilot program, only to find that he again did not have the support 
needed from the legislature to start the program.  
 
In spring 2001, Ridge finally succeeded in passing an education plan that included bills that 
many observers considered a backdoor to vouchers. The plan exchanged an increase in teacher 
pensions for a package of education bills that provided grants to parents for after-school 
tutoring if their children are failing state tests. And perhaps most controversially, the bill allows 
state tax credits of up to 90 percent to corporations for donations to groups financing 
scholarships to private schools or public schools outside of students’ home districts. These two 
provisions of the package were unique nationally. Another aspect of the package that 
supported privatization efforts was a bill that allowed school districts to create “independent 
schools” that were similar to charter schools, but did not have to start from scratch. 
 
 
 
parents are consumers and can choose 
what they consider to be the best schools 
for their children. This theory assumes that 
if people have a choice, they will leave 
schools that aren’t working and those 
schools will have to improve or “go out of 
business.” Vouchers, charter schools, 
privatization of schools, and outsourcing of 
district services are among the most 
prominent mechanisms of reform for 
advocates of this theory of action. (See 
Sidebar 3 about Governor Ridge.) 
In Philadelphia, the market theory of action 
was discussed as a strategy for attracting 
and keeping middle- and working-class 
families in the city.   
 
The way I see it, it’s a way to keep the 
Catholic school system alive and well. If 
those schools crumble, then the city 
crumbles, and those schools deserve 
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support. Besides that, the poor single 
mother should have the same rights as you 
and I. She should have the same right to 
choose.64 
 
People aren’t using the schools. They’re 
going to charter schools or people are 
leaving the city. It’s all about market 
conditions. If people have a choice, they 
don’t choose the public schools.65 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Children Achieving was an ambitious 
reform plan held together by a set of 
powerful ideas about how to improve 
student performance. But as we have 
demonstrated in this section, the abstract 
and ambiguous rhetoric surrounding 
systemic reform was open to many 
interpretations. People understood 
standards, decentralization, and 
accountability from their own frame of 
reference. These differences in 
interpretation were masked by the plan’s 
appeal to logic and common sense, and its 
complexity and comprehensiveness.   
 
How did differences in interpretation play 
out? When did they surface? One example 
was around the District’s decentralization 
plans. As originally articulated, Children 
Achieving aimed to put decisions about 
curriculum and instruction in the hands of 
frontline practitioners and, at the same 
time, to engage parents in school policy 
decisions through local school councils. 
Business leaders, the Commonwealth 
Association of School Administrators (the 
school administrators’ bargaining unit), and 
others working from a managerial 
perspective heard the emphasis on school-
level decision-making as a means of giving 
greater control and autonomy to school 
principals. But grassroots community 
groups like the Alliance Organizing Project 
                                                          
64 Business leader, November 2000. 
 
65 Government leader, October 2000. 
(AOP) focused on local school councils as 
sites for democratic decision-making that 
involved parents as substantive partners in 
shaping school policy (democratic 
revitalization). The AOP was funded by the 
Children Achieving Challenge to train 
parents to be leaders in their schools, 
advocates for their children, and 
supporters for the overall reform effort. 
Often school staff, especially principals, 
were threatened by the new role for 
parents and disgruntled by parents who 
were sometimes vocal in their critique of 
school practices. When school principals 
complained that the AOP’s work with 
parents in their schools was undermining 
administrative authority, business leaders at 
Greater Philadelphia First were inclined to 
reduce AOP’s funding. While they 
ultimately decided to continue to support 
AOP financially, the organizing group was 
barred from working in any school where 
the principal was not open to the idea. Our 
research indicated that there were never 
broad discussions of these competing 
philosophies of decentralization. Instead, 
feelings of betrayal festered.   
 
Likewise, although almost all of our 
interviewees lauded the Superintendent’s 
insistence that “all children can achieve,” 
this belief had different implications 
depending on perspective. For 
managerialists, particularly business 
leaders, it provided an ethical justification 
for the accountability system: If we believe 
that all children can achieve at high levels, 
holding the adults who teach them 
responsible for their learning is the right 
thing to do. They were less likely to heed 
the message of redistribution of resources 
intended by the Superintendent. One 
event put the difference in high relief. On 
the night Hornbeck proposed to the Board 
of Education that it remove admissions 
criteria for special programs and schools so 
that they would be accessible to a wider 
range of students, Mayor Rendell made a 
rare appearance at the Board’s meeting. 
He successfully urged School Board 
30 Civic Engagement and Urban School Improvement: Hard-to-Learn Lessons from Philadelphia 
 
 
members to leave the criteria in place. He 
argued that dismantling these programs 
would further increase the tide of middle-
class parents leaving the city in search of 
strong academic programs. The Board 
voted to leave the criteria in place.   
 
Different perspectives on what it would 
take to improve public education remained 
undiscussed for other reasons. One was the 
close association of the reform’s ideas with 
Hornbeck and people’s perception that he 
would breach no disagreement. As we will 
see in the next section of this report, the 
larger political and economic context of 
inadequate resources also played a 
significant role in discouraging open 
dialogue about differences. As District 
leaders struggled to make the case for 
fairer funding, civic leaders, especially, 
were reluctant to voice dissent about the 
plan. They feared giving ammunition to 
political leaders who wanted to discredit 
the reform and the Superintendent.    
 
Even remembering that our interviews 
occurred before the state took the last 
steps toward takeover, we were surprised 
by how little we heard about the market 
theory of action despite its prominence as 
a priority of then-Governor Ridge. Our 
participants framed the struggle between 
state and city leaders as a debate about 
the costs of adequately financing the city’s 
schools and the state’s responsibility in that 
funding. They focused on the state’s failure 
to institute more equitable school funding 
policies and Hornbeck’s confrontational 
style which they saw as an inappropriate 
strategy for securing public support and 
state cooperation. Only rarely did an 
interviewee discuss the different 
approaches to improving public education 
offered by the Superintendent and the 
Governor.   
 
Several of our interviewees noted that it 
was very difficult to raise questions about 
the plan or mount an argument or offer 
another perspective in the face of the 
compelling logic of “We must change all 
levels of the system at once.” One civic 
leader crystallized this problem: 
 
The completeness of his [Hornbeck’s] vision 
wasn’t amenable to questioning. You 
couldn’t tamper with any part of it.66  
 
The Superintendent’s posture of “You’re 
either for me or against me” compounded 
this dilemma, as did the increasing 
centralization of decision-making. As we 
will detail in the next section of this report, 
important decisions and the discussions 
and debates leading to them were located 
in a handful of people and were therefore 
invisible to frontline educators, parents, the 
general public, and central office 
administrators not part of the inner circle. 
      
The moral dimensions of the reform’s 
message and their close association with 
Hornbeck were barriers to principled 
discussions of important values, beliefs, 
and ideas underlying the reform. 
Hornbeck’s ownership of the reform and 
the reform’s dependence on him as its 
leader and visionary permeated the 
interviews.  
 
Some participants saw this as problematic. 
A business leader said that the 
Superintendent’s centrality distracted 
attention from the plan and its ideas. 
 
Anytime you find someone as messianic as 
David, it’s hard not to concentrate on him 
instead of the agenda.67 
 
And a grassroots leader worried that 
Hornbeck’s ideology might be a barrier to 
coalition building. 
 
Children Achieving is a package deal, and 
he’s a zealot, and he’s on a crusade. I knew 
                                                          
66 Civic leader, March 2000. 
 
67 Business leader, October 2000. 
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from the first meeting that it was going to 
be a tense next few years.68   
 
These and other participants believed that 
the close association of the reform plan 
with the Superintendent was in conflict with 
building broad ownership of Children 
Achieving. The centrality of the 
Superintendent and his beliefs posed an 
obstacle to the difficult conversations 
necessary to building deep understanding 
of, and investment in, the reform’s ideas.    
 
Few interviewees delved beneath the 
rhetoric of “All students can achieve” to 
explore the meaning and implications for 
curriculum and instruction, funding, and 
public engagement that District leaders 
had intended. In her discussion of Children 
Achieving’s legacy, one District leader 
identified two beliefs central to the reform 
commonly overlooked by civic leaders.    
 
Some of the important things that have 
been a part of Children Achieving are the 
focus on rigorous standards, and rigorous 
standards for all children. It may take 
differentiated instruction and different 
amounts of time for children to reach those 
standards, but we can’t start with an 
assumption that there are different 
standards for different children.69 
 
The first assumption contained in her 
statement — that there should be high 
standards for all — was familiar to and 
embraced by most of the people we 
interviewed. The second assumption — 
that there may need to be different 
instructional approaches, different levels of 
resources, different amounts of time in 
order for all students to meet the standards 
— was rarely mentioned by interviewees. 
One business leader explained why he 
                                                          
68 Civic leader, April 2000. 
 
69 Philadelphia Education Fund, Philadelphia public 
school notebook. Philadelphia: Author, 2001. 
thought people did not talk about the 
implications of “All students can achieve:” 
 
David said it, but no one heard it. David 
said that the issue of public education is 
not about time, it’s about commitment. He 
said that all children can achieve at high 
levels if we really commit to them and 
don’t just give them a certain amount of 
time in the classroom. There was a 
philosophical question here: How high of a 
level does he mean? That confused a lot of 
people…  
 
Historically, the only thing American public 
education has set out to do was to have 
students spend a certain amount of time in 
school. It has not been about commitment 
to their learning. David’s idea of 
commitment could have a powerful impact, 
but we haven’t decided to do it.70 
 
In summary, what appeared to be Children 
Achieving’s greatest strengths — the 
power of its ideas, the coherence of its 
plan, and the passion and commitment of 
its leadership — also posed obstacles to 
broad discussion of competing ideas and 
strategies. It is through such discussions 
that citizens are able to explore ideas, and 
that leaders are able to hear concerns and 
either offer retorts or revise their plans. 
Such discussions help leaders put aside 
their own private theories of action to build 
public consensus around a community 
theory. Children Achieving never became a 
shared community theory, but remained 
the theory of a charismatic leader that was 
perceived differently by different civic 
leaders. Without broad public discussions 
and consensus on the strategy, there is 
scant likelihood for deep public investment 
in a reform’s success.  
                                                          
70 Business leader, October 2000. 
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CHILDREN ACHIEVING: 
A CALCULATED RISK 
 
road-based involvement of a city’s 
institutions and citizenry is 
necessary for sustainable 
improvement of urban 
schools.71Clarence Stone analyzed 
school reform in several cities and 
identified “civic capacity” as an important 
predictor of reform efficacy and staying 
power. He defined the term: 
 
Civic capacity concerns the extent to which 
different sectors of the community — 
business, parents, educators, state and 
local officeholders, non-profits, and others 
— act in concert around a matter of 
community-wide import. It involves 
mobilization, that is bringing different 
sectors together, but also developing a 
shared plan of action…To be lasting, civic 
capacity needs an institutional foundation 
for interaction among elites and a 
“grassroots” base through which ordinary 
citizens are engaged…72 
 
Civic elites and ordinary citizens can press 
for more radical improvement strategies 
than district insiders and special interest 
groups who are likely to cling to traditional 
approaches to reform, organization, and 
labor practices.73 They can offer the 
institutional memory necessary for policy 
coherence as educational professionals 
come and go. They can sustain 
improvement efforts by monitoring 
reform’s progress and holding political and 
education leaders accountable for 
following through on their commitments. 
They can serve as watchdogs and witnesses 
for those whose interests are often ignored 
                                                          
71 Hill, Campbell, and Harvey, It takes a city. 
 
72 C. Stone, Civic capacity and urban education, p. 2. 
 
73 W.C. Rich, Black mayors and school politics: The 
failure of reform in Detroit, Gary, and Newark. New 
York: Garland Publishing, 1996. 
— poor students of color and students with 
disabilities. 
 
But the various stakeholders — educators 
and their unions, business elites, city and 
state government officials (especially state 
legislators who control education budgets), 
civic education groups, grassroots-
organizing groups, parents and their 
organizations, and foundations — bring 
different and competing interests to their 
involvement in urban public education. 
Gittell argues that: 
 
The determination of any effort to achieve 
school reform is affected by which 
stakeholders become engaged, the 
inclusiveness of their strategies, and the 
strength of their commitment and 
leadership.74 
 
David Hornbeck understood the 
importance of the “public will” in 
improving schools. He made civic 
engagement one of the 10 components of 
the Children Achieving reform plan. 
(“Strong public engagement is required. 
Unless parents, civic leaders, elected 
officials, the business community, 
postsecondary educators, and the wider 
citizenry understand and support radical 
change, we cannot sustain it.”) In this 
section, we discuss the strategies used by 
District reform leaders to build civic 
engagement in support of Children 
Achieving.  
 
A CALCULATED RISK 
 
Children Achieving can be viewed as a 
calculated risk. When David Hornbeck took 
the job of Superintendent in August 1994, 
he had reason to believe that he could 
muster the political support needed to win 
the additional funding needed to support 
his reform plan. The initial design of 
                                                          
74 M. Gittel, “School reform in New York and 
Chicago: Revisiting the ecology of local games,” 
Urban Affairs Quarterly, (30)1, p. 138. 
B
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Children Achieving was based on the 
assumption that the state and the city 
would provide more dollars for the schools. 
At the time of Hornbeck’s arrival, 
Pennsylvania had a Democratic governor, 
Democratic majorities in the state 
legislature, and Philadelphia had a 
Democratic mayor. The Superintendent 
also had strong backing from business and 
civic leaders in Philadelphia. 
 
District leaders faced obstacles soon after 
Hornbeck’s arrival. The teachers’ union was 
highly critical of the accountability system 
and other reform proposals. One of the 
two daily local newspapers, The Daily 
News, took a hard line against 
Superintendent Hornbeck.75 It ran a series 
called, “The Great School Debate,” which 
criticized the District on many counts, 
including the lack of textbooks in schools, 
issues of school safety, and the high cost of 
implementing the new cluster system. A 
member of the paper’s editorial board 
explained why the paper came out so 
negatively, so early in the reform: 
 
This paper has high expectations for any 
city institution and we land hard where we 
see poor performance. I’d say it was a 
reflex not an overt decision. We value 
political skills and it was clear to us early in 
the game that he [Hornbeck] couldn’t get 
things done in this city.76 
 
And City Council members, who were 
reluctant to raise taxes to support the 
schools, fought back District leaders’ 
requests for more dollars with criticisms of 
                                                          
75 In contrast, the Philadelphia Inquirer’s editorial staff 
urged Philadelphians to give Children Achieving a 
chance. It played an important role in educating its 
readership about the progress of the District through 
its annual “Report Card” on schools. The first report 
card, published just two months after Hornbeck 
become superintendent, was the first public 
announcement ever of information about poverty 
rates, dropout rates, teachers’ salaries, and student 
performance on the SAT-9. 
 
76 Media leader, April 2000. 
the reform plan and the Superintendent. 
Superintendent Hornbeck believed these 
obstacles could be overcome and District 
leaders pursued multiple strategies to 
press city and state political leaders to 
increase funding to Philadelphia schools. 
They intended to align the resources from 
the Annenberg Challenge and various 
other Philadelphia civic organizations with 
the District’s priorities as articulated in the 
Children Achieving Action Design. They 
would leverage all available funds to show 
sufficient early increases in student 
performance and prove that the reform 
plan merited an increased investment of 
local and state dollars. In the meantime, 
they also sought to recruit many others into 
the fight for increased government 
funding. District leaders launched a public 
relations campaign to build broad-based 
support for the reform; they wooed 
business and civic leaders by offering them 
seats on various advisory groups and task 
forces; they funded community organizing 
to build grassroots support. At the same 
time they built coalitions and alliances to 
lobby for increased dollars for public 
education, District leaders also sought 
changes in the state funding formula 
through the courts.  
 
STRATEGY 1: ALIGN 
RESOURCES 
 
In February 1995, six months after David 
Hornbeck’s appointment as 
Superintendent, the School District 
received a $50 million grant from the 
Annenberg Challenge. Among the 
conditions for receiving the grant were the 
requirements to: (1) produce two matching 
dollars (i.e., $100 million over five years) for 
each one received from Annenberg, and (2) 
create an independent management 
structure, preferably located in the city’s 
corporate community, to provide program, 
fiscal, and evaluation oversight of the 
grant. The second requirement reflected 
the Annenberg Challenge’s misgivings 
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about pouring money into large urban 
school bureaucracies and its conviction that 
radical change from inside districts was 
unlikely. District partnerships, they 
believed, with their larger communities 
would bring resources, advocates, 
expertise, and accountability — all of which 
were necessary to reforming schools. 
 
Superintendent Hornbeck turned to 
Greater Philadelphia First (GPF), an 
association of chief executives from the 
region’s largest companies, to house the 
Children Achieving Challenge. GPF leaders 
were, on the one hand, reluctant to 
become so closely involved in the workings 
of the District and to assume oversight of 
the Annenberg Challenge funds, which 
dwarfed GPF’s own operating budget. On 
the other hand, GPF was headed by 
corporate leaders deeply involved in the 
civic life of the city. They believed they 
could play an important role in supporting 
the public schools and they were buoyed 
by Hornbeck’s accountability message, an 
ingredient they believed had been sorely 
lacking in the prior management of the 
District’s schools. They believed that the 
District’s contract with the Philadelphia 
Federation of Teachers was a barrier to 
improving public education. Locating the 
Challenge at GPF offered business leaders 
ready access to the Superintendent and a 
platform for pressing their views. Ultimately 
they were persuaded to assume oversight 
of the Challenge. Furthermore, the 
Challenge’s first Executive Director, Vicki 
Phillips, had been a colleague of 
Superintendent Hornbeck’s in the Kentucky 
reform effort. She was recruited by him to 
head the Challenge, became a member of 
the Superintendent’s Cabinet, and served 
on his Executive Committee. 
 
As we have seen, PATHS/PRISM and the 
Philadelphia Schools Collaborative served 
as important outside partners to the 
District under Constance Clayton. Both 
organizations had pushed for changes in 
the District. Staff at the Pew Charitable 
Trusts who had been instrumental in 
recruiting Hornbeck were persuaded that 
merging the two reform organizations was 
a way to streamline outside partner 
organizations and ensure that their work 
reflected District priorities, thus avoiding 
the kinds of conflicts that had arisen in the 
high school restructuring effort. Warren 
Simmons, who was prominent in the 
national standards movement, was 
recruited to head the newly created 
Philadelphia Education Fund (PEF). Like 
Phillips, Simmons joined the 
Superintendent’s Cabinet and Executive 
Committee. PEF’s work became more 
focused on developing capacity inside 
central administration to establish and 
implement policies congruent with 
standards. It focused less on capacity 
building in schools (e.g., technical 
assistance to high school small learning 
communities, leadership development for 
principals, etc.). 
 
A major principle of systemic reform is that 
a coherent policy environment is essential 
to widespread school improvement; 
without such an environment, educational 
excellence will be isolated to a few schools. 
Policy coherence is achieved instructionally 
by setting standards for what students 
should know and be able to do and then 
aligning curriculum and assessment so that 
what is taught and what is measured flow 
from the standards. It is achieved 
operationally by directing district initiatives 
and resources toward meeting the 
standards. Fullan described the role of 
alignment in systemic reform: 
 
Systemic reform…promises to align the 
different parts of the system, focus on the 
right things, and marshal and coordinate 
resources in agreed-upon directions. The 
idea of systemic reform is to define clear 
and inspiring learning goals for all students, 
to gear instruction to focus on these 
directions, and to back up these changes 
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with appropriate governance and 
accountability procedures.77 
   
Congruent with that strategy, the Children 
Achieving Challenge funds were used to 
create the District infrastructure necessary 
to enact the reform plan. A Challenge staff 
member explained the strategy and its 
rationale: 
 
We put our funding behind things that will 
help the whole District. That’s why we stay 
away from individual schools. So, for 
example, we put money behind standards 
and assessment and professional 
development related to that. Here I’m 
talking about professional development in 
large ways: getting the two networks [the 
Teaching and Learning Network and the 
Family Resource Network] up, leadership 
development, good information systems in 
place.78 
 
The mechanism for aligning Challenge 
funding with District priorities were seven 
Work Groups composed of staff from the 
central office, clusters, schools, the 
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, and, 
in come cases, representatives from critical 
partners (e.g., universities, PEF). Each Work 
Group was charged with developing 
priorities, goals, and implementation plans 
for a particular area of the District’s work 
(School-to-Career, Standards and 
Assessment, and Technology). Funds were 
then allocated from both the Children 
Achieving Challenge budget and the 
District to cover the costs of the Work 
Group-approved plans. 
 
But in 1998, the Work Groups were 
abandoned with the intention that the 
Superintendent’s Cabinet and other 
committees would replace their function. 
But that never happened. Instead, 
                                                          
77 Fullan, “Turning systemic thinking on its head,” p. 
420. 
 
78 Children Achieving Challenge Staff, October 2000. 
decisions were made by the 
Superintendent and a handful of close 
advisors. This new plan resulted in a 
diminished role for outside partners as well 
as field-based educators like cluster 
leaders, principals, and teachers in 
establishing the priorities, policies, and 
plans of the District. Decision-making was 
increasingly isolated in a small group of 
people who shared the belief that 
coherent, aligned educational policy could 
remedy the problems of poor student 
achievement. 
 
Raising matching funds to meet the 
requirements of the Annenberg grant 
presented another opportunity for coalition 
building. To a large extent, this opportunity 
was lost in Philadelphia. The alignment 
strategy made Annenberg dollars virtually 
invisible as the Challenge’s monies blended 
with District funds to pay for District 
infrastructure. Elite support was at least 
partly conditioned on their belief that the 
Annenberg and matching dollars were not 
merely supplanting state and local funds. 
When GPF leaders could not point to 
specific places grant funds made a 
difference, they became uneasy and 
complained that they did not receive 
adequate or accurate reporting from the 
District on how the funds were spent. 
Other funders who contributed to the 
match became frustrated that their money 
entered the “black hole” of District 
financial record keeping and they received 
little credit or acknowledgement for their 
contributions. And people in schools were 
frequently unaware that the Annenberg 
money even existed and certainly did not 
know what it paid for. 
 
In addition, because the Annenberg grant 
and the matching funds went to support 
new District infrastructures, there was little 
attention to building the capacity of 
outside organizations to support the 
schools. (An exception was the creation of 
the Alliance Organizing Project which will 
be discussed later in this section.) In fact, 
Civic Engagement and Urban School Improvement: Hard-to-Learn Lessons from Philadelphia  37 
 
some existing groups such as Citizens 
Committee on Public Education in 
Philadelphia withered and died during 
Children Achieving. This absence of 
intermediary organizations presents a 
major problem to education reformers. A 
foundation staff member described the 
situation: 
 
Philadelphia doesn’t have the intermediary 
organizations that other cities do. We only 
have PEF, and no other intermediary 
capacity. There’s potential capacity in the 
higher education community, but it’s 
applied sporadically. It’s very frustrating, 
especially when contrasting it with Boston, 
which has so much support in organizations 
and people, and a much better economic 
situation.79 
 
STRATEGY 2:  IMPROVE 
STUDENT PERFORMANCE 
 
As mentioned earlier, reform leaders were 
betting that the Annenberg Challenge 
grant and its match could be used to 
improve performance, and that improved 
performance would generate the political 
will to obtain increased state funding either 
through the courts or the legislature, thus 
allowing the reforms to be institutionalized 
and continued.   
 
Student test scores, student and staff 
attendance, and student persistence did 
improve during Children Achieving. But 
student gains on the Districtwide test, the 
SAT-9, were uneven across the District. 
Elementary students made greater gains 
than middle and high school students. 
Schools with higher concentrations of low-
performing students and students living in 
poverty made greater gains than other 
schools. Our research80 indicated that: 
                                                          
79 Foundation leader, November 2000. 
 
80 W. Boyd and J. B. Christman, “A tall order for 
Philadelphia’s new approach to school governance:  
Heal the political rifts, close the budget gaps, AND 
• Fourth-graders made educationally and 
statistically significant gains. These 
gains were likely the result of all-day 
kindergarten and the implementation 
of a literacy program in the primary 
grades in which many schools used 
literacy interns to reduce the teacher-
student ratio. 
 
• In middle schools, eighth-graders made 
steady, but considerably more modest, 
progress than fourth-grade students 
during the first four years of Children 
Achieving. However, scores in math and 
science actually declined slightly in 
spring 2000, despite a strong emphasis 
on test preparation in classrooms. Our 
qualitative research indicated that 
changes in curriculum and instruction in 
middle schools were more superficial 
than in elementary schools. 
Furthermore, middle schools suffered 
from rampant teacher and principal 
turnover that negatively affected their 
learning environments. 
 
• High school students, who performed 
abysmally on the first administration of 
the SAT-9, made little to no gains 
during the early years of the reform. 
Performance did improve in years 4 and 
5. High school students’ attendance 
and persistence rates went up. 
 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 present the test results 
by subject and grade level. 
 
The improvements in test scores are 
noteworthy because Philadelphia had one 
of the most inclusive testing policies in the 
country. The District promoted the testing 
of all students. Each year the pool of   
 
                                                                                       
improve the schools.” In M.D. Usdan and L. Cuban 
(Eds.), Powerful reforms with shallow roots: 
Educational change in six cities (New York: Teachers 
College Press, in press). 
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FIGURE 1. PERCENT OF STUDENTS SCORING AT OR ABOVE BASIC IN MATH 
BY SCHOOL LEVEL, SAT-9, 1996-200081 
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FIGURE 2. PERCENT OF STUDENTS SCORING AT OR ABOVE BASIC IN READING 
BY SCHOOL LEVEL, SAT-9, 1996-2000 
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81 For Figures 1, 2, and 3, percent of K-8 students scoring at above basic in math, reading, and science for 1999-
2000 was not available. 
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FIGURE 3. PERCENT OF STUDENTS SCORING AT OR ABOVE BASIC IN SCIENCE 
BY SCHOOL LEVEL, SAT-9, 1996-2000 
 
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
Year
P
er
ce
nt
ES
K-8
MS
HS
ES 37.1 46.4 36.6 52.2 61.5
K-8 42.2 51.9 43.2 59.3
MS 18.1 23.7 18.8 30.2 27.4
HS 4.9 8.0 5.2 12.0 19.1
1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000
 
    
tested students increased, and analyses 
show that the additional students were 
generally lower performing. The fact that 
scores rose significantly despite this was an 
encouraging achievement. 
 
There was enormous celebration in the 
District about the gains and a huge 
investment in telling the “good news.” 
What were our participants’ assessments of 
the reform’s success? How did they make 
sense of the information on test score 
results and to what degree did the 
District’s performance gains influence their 
assessment of the reform’s progress? 
Approximately 80 percent cited test scores 
as an indicator of some progress, but only 
about half of them saw the increases as 
meaningful. These respondents believed 
that gains were an indication that the 
reform plan was a good one and should be 
continued with some modifications. Some 
commented: 
 
There’s no denying there’s been 
improvement. The test scores have gone 
up. Not just the District’s tests. If you look 
at the Inquirer’s analysis of the state tests, 
Philadelphia made more progress than 
anyone.82 
 
I believe the numbers [the test scores]. 
There was incremental improvement. Given 
the handicaps that David had to work 
under — some that he created for himself 
and some that were there already — my 
sense is that, however incremental, there 
was legitimate progress where it was most 
needed. And that’s among the poor, and 
among the people who don’t have a lot.83 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
82 Foundation leader, January 2000. 
 
83 Foundation leader, August 2000. 
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TEST SCORES WENT UP BUT… 
 
Half of the participants who cited the test 
score gains as evidence of some progress, 
also expressed skepticism about the 
meaningfulness of gains and questioned 
the celebratory statements coming from 
reform leaders. “The test scores are up, 
BUT…” was the view of this group. 
 
There’s been some improvement. Scores 
are up, but not enough and not fast 
enough.84 
 
The superintendent has been relentless in 
his focus on achievement. That’s the good 
side. The bad side is that the schools are 
not improving enough — fast enough or 
across the board enough.85 
 
I think the progress, which I don’t want to 
minimize, is around the low-hanging fruit 
on the tree.86 
 
They have improved incrementally, at least 
the grade schools are doing better. The 
test scores seem to be better. But there 
has not been much improvement in the 
high schools. We were told at the 
beginning that there would not be much 
we could do for the students in the high 
schools, that they were already so far 
behind that we couldn’t expect them to 
meet high standards. I worry that the 
students from the grade schools who have 
made progress will go to these same old 
high schools with the same old programs 
and that they will lose what they have 
gained. They will drop out and we will be 
no better off.87 
 
                                                          
84 Civic leader, March 2000. 
 
85 Media leader, January 2000. 
 
86 School Board member, April 2000. 
 
87 Business leader, August 2000. 
 
These participants were reluctant to put 
too much faith in test score gains. Some 
believed that the pattern of early gains 
would not be sustained over the longer 
term; others that an over-emphasis on the 
test in classroom instruction would 
ultimately result in students who were not 
prepared for postsecondary education or 
for employment in adulthood. 
 
In the short run, if you implement a new 
test and have short-term rewards with 
accountability indexes and so on, you’ll see 
teachers teaching to the test. So short term 
you see test scores going up, but you’ll see 
later if it really helps kids, or better 
prepares them for societal roles. Just 
because test scores are going up, I don’t 
know if kids are any better prepared.88 
  
The scores went up. The bottom line is 
student performance. The reforms seem to 
be making progress. But I worry about 
what children are learning. Maybe it is just 
teaching to the test. I hope not. I want to 
believe that there has been some real 
progress.89 
 
Even though there was improvement on 
tests, people in the business community 
don’t care about tests. They haven’t seen 
results in the kids who are coming to them 
looking for jobs out of high school, and 
that’s what they’re really looking for.90 
 
One higher education respondent raised 
critical questions about what the test 
measured and concluded that testing’s 
influence on curriculum and instruction 
inevitably narrowed the educational 
opportunities for poor students of color: 
 
Testing is a real problem. It’s overly rigid. If 
you did that to our kids [White, middle-
class students], we wouldn’t stand for it. 
                                                          
88 Children Achieving Challenge staff, July 2000. 
 
89 Government leader, July 2000. 
 
90 Former School Board member, October 2000. 
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There’s not equity for poor children. It’s a 
cut-rate education for poor children. In 
order to engage poor children, we need to 
engage their minds, and testing doesn’t do 
that.91 
 
In summary, while a significant majority of 
our participants identified test score gains 
as an indicator of progress, they were 
evenly divided on whether the progress 
was meaningful. These findings offer a 
cautionary tale to policymakers and reform 
leaders about how they use test scores as 
evidence of progress. Citizens often do not 
know how to interpret test scores; they are 
uncertain about appropriate expectations 
for gains; they are skeptical about the 
means used to obtain gains and they are 
distrustful of District claims. As one 
business leader said: 
 
The Annenberg people tell me that 
Philadelphia is their best site so I guess we 
should be pleased with that. I don’t know 
what kind of test score increases to expect. 
I am not an expert so I have to rely on 
others.92 
 
In Philadelphia, as in other urban districts 
where student achievement has been 
abysmal for many years, it was difficult for 
citizens to focus on performance gains 
when absolute performance was so low 
and when they saw and heard so much to 
indicate that schools were problem-ridden. 
 
It’s a struggling system. There are lots of 
good and committed people and lots of 
uninspired and frustrated people in it. It’s 
uneven school-to-school, class-to-class. My 
sense is that it’s improving, but it has a 
huge distance to go in terms of the quality 
of instruction.93 
 
                                                          
91 Higher education leader, November 2000. 
 
92 Business leader, August 2000. 
 
93 Civic leader, April 2000. 
Finally, in a highly contested policy 
environment, test gains — like any other 
kind of data — are frequently used as 
ammunition to defend or oppose a point of 
view. 
 
STRATEGY 3: SEEK INCREASES 
IN CITY AND STATE FUNDING 
THROUGH THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS 
 
Pennsylvania is a large and conservative 
state.94 In the state capitol, rural and 
suburban interests have often clashed with 
those of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. This 
was compounded for Philadelphia when 
the legislature froze the state school 
funding formula in 1993, resulting in a 
steadily decreasing state contribution to 
local school districts.95 In January 2001, 
Education Week gave Pennsylvania a grade 
of “D-“ on funding equity in comparison to 
other states.96 Only seven other states 
received a lower grade. 
 
A loyal supporter of Hornbeck’s and board 
member of Greater Philadelphia First at the 
                                                          
94 In his case study, “Philadelphia: Prospects and 
Challenges” (see footnote 15), Whiting relates that 
James Carville, a political consultant to Bill Clinton 
and other Democrats, portrayed Pennsylvania as a 
state “with two great cities [Pittsburgh and 
Philadelphia] at either end and Alabama in 
between.” Philadelphians often quote Carville in 
their depiction of the political reality that pits 
Philadelphia against the state capitol and upstate 
rural interests. 
 
95 Actually both urban and rural districts have 
suffered under Pennsylvania education finance 
policy, but only recently have there been efforts to 
build coalitions across the urban/rural divide in 
support of finance reform. In fact, after resigning as 
Superintendent, David Hornbeck spearheaded an 
advocacy group, Good Schools Pennsylvania, which 
is organizing in support of new state policies. 
 
96 “Quality counts 2001: A better balance: Standards, 
tests, and the tools to succeed,” Education Week 
(January 2001). States were graded according to 
their contribution to equalizing funding across all 
school districts in the state. 
42 Civic Engagement and Urban School Improvement: Hard-to-Learn Lessons from Philadelphia 
 
 
beginning of the reform described failed 
attempts to build a bridge to Harrisburg: 
 
I went to Harrisburg to talk to Governor 
Ridge. The message that I was trying to get 
across to the state was, “We know that the 
District is not perfect. But we have a man 
running it today who is most unusual 
because he believes that he can fix it. This 
is an incredible asset for you. What do we 
have to do to link arms with you?” 
Honestly, Ridge believes that you can’t fix 
the Philadelphia public school district. He’d 
rather skirt it by building an alternative 
system. In defense of Ridge, even if he had 
wanted to support Philadelphia schools, he 
might not have been able to politically 
because of opposition in the House of 
Representatives.97 
 
A turning point in the relationship between 
the District and the city occurred in 1997 
when District leaders, Mayor Rendell and 
City Council President Street, jointly 
distributed a white paper titled, “Realities 
Converge: This Year is Different.” The 
paper outlined a pending fiscal crisis. It 
explained that the years of insufficient 
funding by the state and cost cutting by 
the District had reached a point where 
there were essentially no further ways to 
cut corners without cutting deeply into 
important programs. The language in the 
white paper was strong: 
 
The School District does not take these 
actions lightly. Yet, Philadelphia’s children 
deserve better treatment from the 
state…The state’s continued denial of its 
basic constitutional responsibility simply 
leaves no alternative. The indisputable fact 
is that the Commonwealth has denied its 
moral and constitutional mandate to 
provide a thorough and efficient education 
to the city’s school children…98 
                                                          
97 Business leader, August 2000. 
 
98 School District of Philadelphia, Realities converge: 
This year is different. Philadelphia: Author, 1997. 
This paper set a new tone in the fight for 
funding; it made school funding a moral 
matter and laid the blame for inadequate 
resources for Philadelphia’s children at the 
feet of the state. Later, speeches by the 
Superintendent escalated an already 
charged environment with the accusation 
that state funding policy was “racist.” The 
District’s white paper and subsequent 
rhetoric by Hornbeck enraged the 
Governor and other state leaders. 
 
David didn’t help himself with this process. 
I don’t know if he could have been 
politically counseled successfully or not. He 
got himself in the crosshairs as a big part of 
this issue, and no leader can afford that. 
They absolutely hated him in Harrisburg.  
And that’s not too strong a word. I heard 
people in Harrisburg say “so long as that 
guy’s there, you’ll never get a dime.” Any 
contribution from the state would involve 
his departure.99 
 
As this participant suggests, the battle for 
funding became an increasingly personal 
one, fought between the Superintendent 
and state leaders. One result of this 
personalized struggle was that the reform 
effort became still further identified as the 
effort of an individual — David Hornbeck. 
The Superintendent repeatedly asserted 
that he had the full support of Mayor 
Rendell and then-City Council President 
John Street in the fight for increased state 
funding. They initially made a public show 
of support, but in truth, Rendell was a 
largely “silent partner” throughout his 
administration. One civic leader noted, 
“Frankly there were years when Ed Rendell 
didn’t even mention schools in his State of 
the City address.”100 
 
The Governor and legislative leadership 
were adamant in their refusal to alter the 
school funding formula or provide the 
                                                          
99 Business leader, August 2000. 
 
100 Philadelphia Daily News (2000, August 24). 
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money requested. They believed that the 
District used existing funding inefficiently, 
that the District’s teacher contract was a 
major obstacle to improvement, and that 
the city needed to provide a larger share of 
school costs. The District argued that 
Children Achieving had not been costly 
and that the District had in fact taken 
significant steps to cut administrative 
spending. Overall costs had increased 
because student enrollment had grown, 
special education costs had gone up, and 
charter schools were a drain on District 
funds.101Although the state did provide 
Philadelphia with some one-time grants, 
these were small in comparison to what 
District leaders insisted was required to 
continue with the Children Achieving 
reform agenda. 
 
Additionally, the Governor had quite 
different views on what it would take to 
improve Philadelphia schools. He believed 
that vouchers and charter schools were the 
remedy. Repeatedly frustrated in his 
attempts to get a school voucher bill 
through the legislature, Governor Ridge 
looked for other ways to bring market 
solutions to bear on the ills of public 
schooling. (See Sidebar 3 on page 28 for a 
discussion of the Governor Ridge’s plan for 
school choice.) 
 
When Superintendent Hornbeck 
threatened to adopt an unbalanced budget 
in the spring of 1999 and to close the 
schools early, the state responded with Act 
46, a draconian bill aimed directly at 
Philadelphia. It allowed the state to take 
over the District if Hornbeck pursued his 
threat.102 Rather than cutting the proposed 
                                                          
101 School District of Philadelphia, Financial update. 
Philadelphia: Author, 2001. 
 
102 All the unions opposed this bill, but it passed 
easily despite its numerous incendiary features, such 
as provisions for replacing the School Board and 
superintendent, suspending the teachers’ contract, 
laying off teachers, and, in the words of the PaFT, 
“unilateral school closings and privatization by 
school budget, Philadelphia leaders 
persuaded two local banks to issue the 
District letters of credit enabling it to 
borrow $250 million to keep operating 
through June 1999.103 Philadelphians had 
taken notice of public education, and the 
city’s schools were a key issue in the 
mayoral primaries and election, as noted in 
the Philadelphia Inquirer: 
 
In a departure from past mayoral 
campaigns, when the schools barely rated a 
mention, this year’s crop of candidates is 
talking often and avidly about public 
education. And in keeping with the 
national trend, many of the prescriptions 
center on changing how the school system 
is run and financed.104 
 
In November 1999, the citizens of 
Philadelphia elected a new mayor, 
Democrat John Street, who voiced support 
for Superintendent Hornbeck and his 
Children Achieving reforms. They also 
approved a change to the City Charter, 
which allowed the new Mayor to appoint all 
of the Board of Education members 
concurrently with his term of office.105 In 
                                                                                       
converting public schools to charter schools without 
approval by teachers and parents.” (As quoted in the 
Wall Street Journal, 1998, May 15). The strong 
support for this bill reflected the legislature’s 
negative view of Philadelphia as an insatiable and 
“bottomless pit,” as well as their antipathy toward 
the unions and Philadelphia's school superintendent. 
 
103 K.A. White, “Philadelphia budget passes, easing 
takeover threat,” Education Week (1998, June 10), p. 
6. 
 
104 D. Mezzacappa and S. Snyder, “Candidates agree: 
Mayor’s control of school board should increase,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer (1998, May 13). 
 
105 The mayoral race was very close. Street’s main 
opposition was from Republican Sam Katz, a 
government finance consultant. Both candidates said 
that public education would be a top priority in their 
administration, but they had very different visions for 
how to improve the schools. Katz called for the 
removal of Hornbeck and looked to school choice 
reforms — vouchers and charter schools — as the 
only solutions for the struggling school system. In an 
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addition, Mayor Street appointed Debra 
Kahn as the city’s first Secretary of 
Education to focus entirely on education 
issues.  
 
In his first year, Mayor Street made 
education a top priority and took a 
conciliatory stance toward state leaders. 
One new Board member hailed a new era 
in the District-state relationship, “We must 
go to the state as a united front and 
humbly.”106 While Street proclaimed that 
David Hornbeck was his choice for 
Superintendent and that Children 
Achieving was the right reform plan for 
Philadelphia, the Mayor’s actions signaled 
to some that he was ready for a change. As 
one union leader put it, “Street loved 
Hornbeck to death.”107 And a District 
administrator said: 
 
Mayor Street wanted a new strategy for 
handling the politics of public education.  
David Hornbeck was confrontational and 
the Mayor wanted something different. He 
and his Secretary of Education and the 
President of the Board decided to look for 
a CEO-type to deal with the political and 
financial stuff.108 
 
The political impasse between the District 
and the state came to a head again in the 
spring of 2000 when the District faced a 
budget deficit of $205 million. Under 
pressure from the state takeover law to 
balance the budget, the Philadelphia Board 
of Education made cuts and adopted a 
budget of nearly $1.6 billion which 
contained no new money for the programs 
the Superintendent felt were required to 
                                                                                       
ironic twist, Katz was appointed Executive Director of 
Greater Philadelphia First soon after the mayoral 
election and has since pushed for school choice 
reforms coupled with increased state funding from 
his position there. 
 
106 School Board member, January 2000. 
 
107 Labor leader, October 2000. 
 
108 School District leader, February 2001. 
fully implement the Children Achieving 
reform agenda. As a result, the 
implementation of new promotion and 
graduation requirements was postponed 
and the number of days allocated for 
teacher professional development was 
reduced. Not willing to remain to oversee 
the piece-by-piece dismantling of his 
reform agenda, Superintendent Hornbeck 
announced his resignation on June 5, 2000. 
 
Ultimately, Mayor Street’s conciliatory 
approach, which included suspending a 
federal lawsuit charging that the state’s 
funding formula was discriminatory, failed 
to win increased state dollars. Governor 
Ridge and his successor, Governor Mark 
Schweiker,109 were steadfast in their 
insistence that the state would not provide 
more money without direct control over 
the schools. 
 
The struggle between state and city 
leaders over financing the schools drained 
enormous time and energy from the hard 
work of instructional improvement, as 
District staff calculated and re-calculated 
what it would cost to fully fund the reform 
plan and provide Philadelphia students 
with sufficient opportunities to learn.  
Superintendent Hornbeck’s passionate and 
shrill rhetoric made him the lightning rod of 
public debate. Other civic leaders were 
divided over what strategy to pursue and 
were reluctant to antagonize the Governor. 
The community did not unite around a 
strategy to achieve fairer funding for the 
city’s schools.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
109 Schweiker assumed office when Ridge was drafted 
by President Bush to become Director of Homeland 
Security after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks. 
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STRATEGY 4: BUILD A 
COALITION OF SUPPORT 
AMONG BUSINESS ELITES 
 
In the early years of the reform, GPF 
leaders championed Children Achieving 
and its leadership. This help was crucial to 
the Superintendent at a time when the 
Philadelphia Daily News, some of the city’s 
political leaders, and the teachers’ union 
were offering harsh criticism of the 
Superintendent and his plan. By June 1996, 
18 months after receiving the Annenberg 
grant, the Children Achieving Challenge 
had raised more than 90 percent of the 
required $100 million match — 
outdistancing all other Annenberg sites.110 
In the summer of 1996, business and civic 
leaders purchased space on the editorial 
page of the Philadelphia Inquirer to ask the 
community to come together in support of 
Hornbeck’s reform agenda and stay the 
course with Children Achieving. The 
Children Achieving Challenge, in 
partnership with the Greater Philadelphia 
Urban Affairs Coalition, also funded a 
widespread public information campaign 
called the Philadelphia Campaign for Public 
Education.111 
                                                          
110 Consortium for Policy Research in Education, 
Research for Action, and the OMG Center for 
Collaborative Learning, A first-year evaluation report 
of Children Achieving. 
 
111 Between 1995 and 1998, the Campaign, funded 
by the Pew Charitable Trusts, worked to “sell” the 
reform agenda. It published fliers and newsletters 
that gave clear explanations of Children Achieving's 
components. It led print, radio, and television 
advertising campaigns that initially gave information 
about SAT-9 testing, standards, full-day 
kindergarten, and school-to-career programs and 
later heralded the District’s success in improving test 
scores, reducing bureaucracy, and setting tougher 
standards, among other topics. The campaign also 
worked to support the public engagement efforts of 
other organizations by working with those 
organizations on several events, including: Don’t 
Miss the Bus Tours, which brought hundreds of city 
and suburban elected officials, business leaders, 
community leaders, parents, and citizens into schools 
to see the impact of the reform on individual schools; 
But the District-PFT contract negotiations 
of 1996 marked a turning point in 
Superintendent Hornbeck’s relations with 
GPF leaders. GPF leaders were extremely 
disappointed that School District officials 
did not extract major concessions from the 
teachers’ union. While they understood 
that Mayor Rendell was as culpable as the 
Superintendent for the contract, business 
leaders directed their anger at the 
Superintendent and began to withdraw 
their support for the District’s reform 
agenda. A regional CEO and member of 
the Children Achieving Challenge 
Oversight Committee explained the 
perspective shared by numerous corporate 
leaders: 
 
Hornbeck and [David] Cohen [Chief-of-Staff 
during Rendell’s first term and a lead city 
negotiator in the PFT talks] promised us 
they were going to negotiate some 
changes. They made a commitment and on 
the strength of that promise, the business 
community raised the match for 
Annenberg. We kept our end of the 
bargain but they didn’t. We wanted the 
right to assign people to schools without 
going by seniority, the right to make hiring 
decisions at the school level, some control 
over how prep time is used, and several 
other changes but we got none of them.112 
 
Corporate leaders’ disillusionment with 
Hornbeck also grew as they perceived that 
the District was not satisfying the priorities 
of the business community — efficient 
financial management and growth of 
business opportunities. Corporate leaders 
                                                                                       
rallies in Harrisburg to advocate for equitable 
funding; Kindergarten Read-in Days, in which 
celebrities, elected officials, local business and 
community leaders, and community members read 
their favorite stories to kindergarteners around the 
city; charter school forum, which was designed to 
explain what charter schools were to a lay audience. 
These events contributed to giving Children 
Achieving a greater presence in the local media and 
also increased public awareness of the reform effort. 
 
112 Business leader, August 2000. 
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were frustrated in their attempts to get 
reform leaders to outsource a greater 
number of the District’s service contracts to 
private companies. They believed that the 
Superintendent was on board with this 
idea, but his inaction in this area fueled the 
more conservative GPF leaders’ perception 
that the District was inefficient and not a 
good steward of public funds. 
Business leaders were also furious with 
Hornbeck for his confrontational style, 
which they saw as an inappropriate 
strategy for securing public support and 
state cooperation. Two business leaders 
described their reactions to Superintendent 
Hornbeck’s rhetoric about the state 
funding policies and state leaders: 
 
I was also upset about how David handled 
the politics. The business community felt 
that he was a good educator but a terrible 
politician. He offended people. He 
intentionally irritated them. He was hired to 
be an educator, not a preacher. I know he 
has a doctorate in theology but his 
sermons were misplaced…So the state 
wouldn’t talk to him at all and we couldn’t 
resolve the District’s problems without 
their help.113 
 
Yes, and he could have gotten it if he’d 
been a better politician or stayed out of 
politics. He could have gotten it if he’d 
given up more for vouchers. He alienated 
the Catholic school system. I believe in 
bringing everyone into the tent and not 
kicking anyone out, and David didn’t do 
that…We depend on Harrisburg, and we 
won’t get anything if we tell them they’re 
stupid, ugly, and wrong…David should 
have said, “Look, we both want 
accountability” and worked from common 
ground.114 
 
A Children Achieving Challenge staff 
member described the shift in the business 
                                                          
113 Business leader, August 2000. 
 
114 Business leader, November 2000. 
community’s stance toward Children 
Achieving: 
 
The corporate community at the beginning, 
and along the way, had competing 
interests. I think that there was a struggle 
between the educational issues they knew 
to be critical to the city’s long-term health 
and their own economic health. On the one 
hand, they wanted to support an 
accountability, standards-driven agenda. 
There was also support for the Governor — 
his economic stance and his educational 
agenda. The Governor’s commitment to 
economic development is pretty solid, from 
the business community’s perspective. It 
was a constant tug of war. Later, David’s 
personality made even more of a difference 
for them [corporate leaders]. I watched the 
scale start to tip, and split the business 
community. Being inside, I saw where it 
came from, even if I didn’t like it.115 
 
Midway through Hornbeck’s tenure as 
Superintendent, board leadership at GPF 
changed and took a more conservative 
turn. Changes in the regional and national 
economic picture were transforming the 
nature of business leadership in 
Philadelphia. Many local corporations (e.g., 
CoreStates Bank, Scott Paper, SmithKline, 
and others) were taken over by companies 
based outside of Philadelphia, which 
lessened the commitment of business 
leadership to the well-being of the city. In 
addition, city leaders were increasingly 
interested in partnering with regional 
leaders to address mutual areas of concern, 
and GPF had expanded its membership 
base to include regional corporations. This 
meant that the organization now 
represented suburban as well as urban 
interests. By June 2000, when 
Superintendent Hornbeck resigned, only 
four of Greater Philadelphia First’s 
founding 23 CEOs remained. These shifts 
in the city’s economic life served to isolate 
                                                          
115 Children Achieving Challenge staff, October 2000. 
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corporate leaders from other sectors of 
Philadelphia’s civic community.116 
A funder of reform described the shift: 
 
What happened was a rapid transformation 
from businesses led by Philly people to 
businesses without a vested interest in 
Philadelphia, or an understanding of the 
city.117 
 
Several participants contrasted the new 
corporate leadership to what had 
previously existed. One explained: 
 
David believed you could make a social 
contract with the business community, but 
he looked up and they were gone. I don’t 
think the corporate community is playing a 
healthy, visible constructive role in public 
education. But they carry tremendous 
weight. It’s a combination of factors. So 
few businesses are local now. And there 
are some leaders who came through the 
Archdiocese system. They want to keep 
taxes down and have vouchers.118 
 
Business leaders insisted that it was the 
Superintendent’s inflammatory rhetoric 
about state leaders and their role in the 
state’s sorry school funding policies that 
pushed them out of the fold. Many were 
strong supporters of the Archdiocese 
system and were attracted to Governor 
Ridge’s proposal for vouchers which they 
believed would be good for business by 
stemming the flow of middle- and working-
class families from the city, thereby 
buoying the local economy and 
                                                          
116 The relative isolation of the business community 
from other civic leadership was confirmed by our 
network analysis of participants’ sources of 
information about public education. This analysis 
showed that business leaders received their 
information from the newspapers and the 
Superintendent and were highly unlikely to interact 
with members of other stakeholder groups about 
public education issues. 
 
117 Civic leader, October 2000. 
 
118 Civic leader, May 2000. 
strengthening the quality of the workforce. 
They tried to persuade Superintendent 
Hornbeck to work with the Governor on 
this issue. 
 
Early on, we tried to talk David into giving 
the Governor his voucher plan. He would 
have taken that card away and could have 
moved the discussion since we’d still have 
a tremendous number of kids to educate. 
The reality is that the voucher kids don’t 
perform any better, but their parents feel 
better about the school. It’s really a 
creaming process because the parents who 
take advantage of vouchers are probably 
already involved in their kid’s life. 
Personally, I’m for vouchers, but it’s hard 
when it’s a magic bullet by conservatives. I 
want to implement it but not as a magic 
bullet. As a magic bullet, I’m not certain 
that it really helps the 10,000 who get 
vouchers.119 
 
Civic and community leaders that we 
interviewed were disheartened by the 
behavior of the corporate community. One 
explained that business leaders’ orientation 
made it difficult for them to be patient and 
persist in the face of serious social 
problems: 
 
The business community thinks short term. 
They think in terms of quarters — the 
furthest into the future they might look is 
two years. They pulled back because there 
were not results soon enough.120 
 
Others were harsher in their assessment of 
the business community’s role. 
 
Right now this corporate community gets 
off the hook. It skates. It’s having too good 
a party right now. Maybe when Wall Street 
crashes, they’ll realize what’s going on. It 
stands to lose eventually. We’ve allowed 
the development of ways for the education 
                                                          
119 Business leader, July 2000.  
 
120 Former School Board member, October 2000. 
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FIGURE 4. SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of the labor force to come from elsewhere 
and government brokers for corporate 
interests.121 
 
One of the questions that we asked 
interviewees was, “Where do you get your 
most reliable source of information about 
the School District of Philadelphia?” Figure 
4 depicts the strength of the lines of 
communication among the sectors included 
in our research. The School District played 
the primary role in providing interviewees 
with information about the District and its 
schools. The media and community 
organizations also played important roles in 
                                                          
121 Civic leader, May 2000. 
providing the interviewees with 
information. There was moderate-strong 
reciprocal communication among the 
District, foundations, community 
organizations, and the media. Labor and 
business were the most isolated sectors; 
the information they received was from a 
very limited number of sectors, and 
likewise, they provided information to a 
limited number.  
 
As this discussion has shown, business and 
civic leaders were initially drawn to the 
major ideas of the reform — particularly 
accountability — and the charisma of the 
new Superintendent. Despite efforts to 
engage civic and business elites in the 
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reform, the business community’s support 
for District leadership and the reform plan 
declined precipitously and business leaders 
became increasingly isolated from other 
civic leaders. 
 
STRATEGY 5: BUILD A 
GRASSROOTS MOVEMENT OF 
PARENTS AND COMMUNITY 
MEMBERS 
 
The Children Achieving plan articulated a 
new vision for the role of parents in public 
education. In another report in this series, 
on parents’ roles in Children Achieving, the 
authors explain that reform leaders saw 
“parents as critical players in school 
reform.”122 They envisioned parents as 
collaborators in reform and, in doing so, 
moved away from other approaches to 
involving parents either as clients to be 
served by schools or as consumers who 
‘buy’ the best product (or school). This 
vision of positioning parents as partners in 
reform fit with the reform’s emphasis on 
accountability. In addition to engaging 
parents in the process of improving 
schools, it emphasized parents’ roles in 
holding schools, and District, city, and state 
officials accountable for the quality of 
public education. 
 
Reform leaders also looked to parents’ new 
roles as a strategy for building support for 
Children Achieving and building a lobbying 
campaign to press city and state 
government leaders for increased funding 
for Philadelphia’s schools. Developing a 
strong base of parents and community 
members who would participate in and 
advocate for Children Achieving was seen 
as an important strategy to create local 
                                                          
122 E. Gold, A. Rhodes, S. Brown, S. Lytle, and D. 
Waff, Clients, consumers, or collaborators? Parents 
and their roles in school reform during Children 
Achieving, 1995-2000. Philadelphia: Consortium for 
Policy Research in Education, University of 
Pennsylvania, 2001, p. 1. 
support for the reform agenda, which 
would improve the chances of increased 
city and state funding. 
 
But there are many barriers to involving 
parents in schools and our participants 
were well versed in the obstacles: 
 
We’ve also got to do more to mobilize 
parents. We need to help schools be more 
inclusive. You can do all the mobilizing in 
the world, but if they’re not inclusive, you 
do more harm than good. There is a 
struggle around the notion of community 
involvement, what that means, how the 
district and schools can work with 
parents.123 
 
We have to get parents involved. This is 
hard. They are afraid to come to school. 
They have bad memories of school. Many 
failed themselves. Some can’t read. They 
don’t know how to be advocates for their 
own children. But we have to get them 
involved in their children’s education.124 
 
Many participants recognized that 
educational improvement was unlikely 
without a public clamor for change, and 
that parents were key to that outcry: 
 
My main criticism about Children Achieving 
is that you can’t do this kind of reform 
without more widespread support. There 
needs to be a demand for it. There are 
other parents and community leaders who 
could support the agenda more strongly, 
but I don’t think the District tried to 
engage those people and it cost them in 
the end. 125 
 
The reform’s design and implementation 
included numerous components aimed at 
operationalizing the goal of parents as 
partners in reform. These included: the 
                                                          
123 School Board member, April 2000. 
 
124 Government leader, July 2000. 
 
125 Civic leader, April 2000. 
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inclusion of parents in activities and 
decision-making previously reserved for 
education professionals, the establishment 
of local school councils, the creation of a 
parent-organizing organization 
independent of the District, and a more 
open policy in the reporting of data about 
student outcomes. 
 
Children Achieving began with a lot of 
promise for including parents in new ways. 
In 1995, parents and educators came 
together to develop the academic 
standards for what students should know 
and be able to do in different subjects and 
grade levels. Turning the development of 
standards over to teachers, parents, and 
community members was an important 
decision early in the reform effort. It 
signaled that reform would be a public 
endeavor and that educators were not the 
only stakeholders who had important 
knowledge about what students should 
know and be able to do. But in hindsight, 
reform leaders believed that the effort did 
not result in the grassroots buy-in hoped 
for: 
 
There was a lot of energy put into the 
process. But at the time, we didn’t see that 
the people who had developed the 
standards could be advocates and 
champions for them with other parents and 
teachers. That was a missed opportunity on 
our part. We thought we had done enough 
just to have them locally developed.126 
 
We ended up allowing the public to shape 
the standards in an attempt to engage 
them with the reform. But in the end, 
giving the community control of standards 
didn’t increase ownership.127 
 
As these participants describe, involving 
parents and community members in 
developing academic standards gave them 
                                                          
126 Civic leader, 1998. 
 
127 Children Achieving Challenge staff, October 2000. 
a brief opportunity to voice their opinions 
and have an important hand in shaping the 
reform. It did not, however, result in a 
lasting base of parent and community 
leadership. 
 
Another promising element of the reform 
was the establishment of local school 
councils (LSCs), composed of parents, 
teachers, and a school’s principal, which 
would have broad authority at the school 
level over policy matters, including budget 
allocation, safety and security measures, 
and facilities operation and management. 
The councils, which were designed to have 
an equal representation of parents and 
teachers, would give parents a new, 
decision-making role in schools. While the 
local school councils held potential for 
parents and community members, parents’ 
roles on the councils were quickly limited 
when the PFT pushed for, and won, a 51 
percent majority of teachers on the 
councils. Further, schools had difficulties 
putting local school councils in place. In 
order for a school council to be certified 
(and thus recognized by the District), one 
adult from at least 35 percent of student 
households had to participate in the 
election of parent representatives. This 
proved too difficult for most schools.  
Some of those schools created uncertified 
school councils, but these lacked the 
authority and decision-making power 
afforded to councils recognized by the 
District.  Several of our participants 
believed that District leaders did not go far 
enough in creating the conditions that 
would bring authentic parent and 
community involvement through local 
school councils: 
 
David [Hornbeck] wasn’t radical. He was 
reformist. Part of his plan was to have a 
community impact in schools through 
school councils but in all the time that he 
was in Philadelphia, he didn’t get LSCs in 
even 50 percent of schools. If that had 
really happened, and parents had been 
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given real authority, then that would have 
been radical.128 
 
Local decision-making and LSCs never got 
off the ground. I’m not sure how many 
“real” school councils there are — that is, 
how many are actually participatory bodies.  
I would like to see more of that.129 
 
Gold, Rhodes, Brown, Lytle, and Waff 
describe the challenges of forming 
legitimate local school councils: 
 
The reform did not take account of how 
deeply unsettling the shift of power among 
schools, parents, and community would be 
to many principals and teachers. Reform 
planners underestimated what it would 
take for schools, especially in low-income, 
racially-isolated neighborhoods, to turn 
themselves around and work with parents 
as collaborators in school reform.130 
 
A third promising element for creating new 
roles for parents in reform was the creation 
of the Alliance Organizing Project (AOP), a 
new organization devoted to building 
parent leadership. When the AOP was 
formed, Philadelphia was already home to 
a number of community-based efforts to 
improve schools, both on a neighborhood 
level and citywide. 
 
Concerned about the lack of parent and 
community involvement in previous 
education reform efforts, the leaders of 
several education advocacy organizations 
formed the AOP, with funding and support 
from the Children Achieving Challenge. 
The AOP’s mission — supporting a cadre 
of community organizers who would 
develop parent leadership teams in schools 
across the District,131 matched 
                                                          
128 Former School Board member, October 2000. 
 
129 Civic leader, October 2000. 
 
130 Gold, Rhodes, Brown, Lytle, and Waff, Clients, 
consumers, or collaborators?, p. 12. 
 
Superintendent Hornbeck’s vision of 
including community organizing as a 
component of Children Achieving. As a 
result, the AOP was included in the 
Children Achieving Action Design. Despite 
this connection to the reform effort, the 
AOP maintained an independence from the 
Challenge as its mission and direction were 
set by an independent board of directors. 
 
The AOP’s organizing efforts were never as 
far-reaching as intended. The organization 
planned to have organizers in all 22 
clusters, but in reality, only became 
established in 12 clusters, with active 
parent teams in 30 schools. The new roles 
that AOP intended to create for parents 
met significant resistance from principals 
and other advocacy organizations, which 
limited AOP’s outreach efforts and support 
within the District. As Gold, Rhodes, 
Brown, Lytle, and Waff describe: 
 
Neither Hornbeck nor others in the central 
office anticipated the resistance from local 
schools, especially among principals, that 
AOP organizers would meet as they 
prepared parents and community members 
to become co-leaders in education 
reform…A number of principals jumped to 
the conclusion early in the effort that AOP 
was adversarial and would blame them for 
their children’s educational problems.  
These principals made it difficult and 
sometimes impossible for an AOP 
organizer to work in their schools.132 
 
Principals’ resistance was made plain when 
the Commonwealth Association of 
School Administrators, the principals’ 
union, made the AOP an issue in contract 
                                                                                       
131 See Gold, Rhodes, Brown, Lytle, and Waff, Clients, 
consumers, or collaborators? for a complete 
description of AOP and where it fit into Children 
Achieving’s efforts to involve parents in the reform 
effort, as well as a case study of AOP’s work in one 
school. 
 
132 Gold, Rhodes, Brown, Lytle, and Waff, Clients, 
consumers, or collaborators?, p. 19. 
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negotiations and Hornbeck agreed that 
having the AOP at individual schools would 
be left up to principals’ discretion. It was 
not only school administrators, however, 
who resisted the AOP’s presence in 
Philadelphia’s schools. Some advocacy 
organizations, too, feared that the AOP 
would usurp their work with parents, and 
the fact that it was funded through the 
Children Achieving Challenge encouraged 
these fears.133 
  
This resistance to the AOP led reform 
leaders at the Challenge to decrease their 
commitment to it, in favor of encouraging 
all groups working with parents to work 
together, regardless of their approach to 
involving parents.134 Thus, although the 
AOP played a vital role in engaging parents 
in new ways in their schools, it did not 
meet the reform leaders’ original vision for 
a Districtwide community-organizing effort. 
 
A fourth promising element for changing 
the relationships between parents and 
schools was an increased sharing of 
information and data about student 
achievement and school performance. 
Reform leaders achieved this in part by 
publishing the test scores of all schools 
annually in the Philadelphia Inquirer and, in 
later years, posting them on the School 
District’s web site. In the first three years of 
the reform, attempts to increase 
information sharing were also 
complemented by the Philadelphia 
Campaign for Public Education’s 
advertising campaigns. Civic leaders noted 
the positive impact of these efforts: 
 
Education is much more on people’s minds. 
There used to be despair and no attention. 
It is now widely understood that problems 
need to be addressed. Also, there is more 
                                                          
133 Ibid. 
 
134 Ibid, p. 20. 
open sharing of data and we can look at 
where schools are working.135 
 
Participants also had reservations, however, 
about the real meaning of the data that 
was shared and how parents and 
community members could use it, echoing 
many of the concerns around test scores 
that civic leaders described earlier: 
 
It seems that scores may go up but the 
school is still in the toilet in terms of its 
climate, and the instruction, and what kids 
are really learning. My hope is that the 
progress on scores is not a technical point. 
But change has not been dramatic enough 
for parents to have confidence in what’s 
going on.136 
 
Thus, while participants applauded the 
School District’s openness with information 
about student performance and many 
parents and community members did 
become more informed about their 
schools’ performance during Children 
Achieving, this information sharing did not 
always translate to increased support for 
the reform effort. While reform leaders’ 
efforts to share information about test 
scores may not have significantly changed 
parents’ roles in schools, they did create a 
system that was more open to critique and 
input from the community. 
 
Reform leaders’ strategies for building a 
grassroots movement of parents and 
community members who could advocate 
for the reform both locally and in 
Harrisburg fell short of their expectations 
for many reasons including: skeptical 
school administrators, divisions within the 
advocacy community, a lack of necessary 
supports to fully implement structures such 
as local school councils or organizations 
such as the AOP, and, above all, a 
misjudging of the deep cultural changes 
                                                          
135 Media leader, April 2000. 
 
136 Media leader, April 2000. 
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that were needed to build a grassroots 
movement and a misguided strategy for 
orchestrating it from above and inside the 
District. Reform leaders’ commitment to 
creating new roles for parents in schools 
and school reform faded when the efforts 
did not result in large numbers of parents 
who could go to Harrisburg to advocate for 
increased funding.137 
 
STRATEGY 6: USE LEGAL 
ACTION TO PUSH FOR 
EQUITABLE FUNDING 
 
A final strategy identified by reform leaders 
was to seek increased funding from the 
state through legal means. Since 1997, the 
District, in partnership with the city and 
community groups, has pursued two legal 
actions against the state. The first was a 
lawsuit in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court that claimed the state had violated 
its obligation under the state constitution 
to provide a “thorough and efficient” 
education for all children in Pennsylvania. 
This case was similar to many school 
finance lawsuits nationally. But in March 
1998, a state court dismissed the case, 
arguing that it was lawmakers and not the 
court that must determine what constitutes 
an adequate education for students as well 
as how much money is needed to provide 
for it. And unlike courts in other states, the 
court did not order lawmakers to 
determine a fiscal remedy to the state’s 
funding system. Several of our informants 
speculated that as long as state court 
judges are elected, it is unlikely that the 
Pennsylvania legal system would render a 
decision that significantly altered how 
public schools are financed. 
 
The second legal action was a lawsuit, 
Powell v. Ridge, filed in March 1998 in a 
U.S. District Court by the District, city, 
parents, students, and various advocacy 
                                                          
137 Gold, Rhodes, Brown, Lytle, and Waff, Clients, 
consumers, or collaborators?, p. 20. 
groups. The suit argues that the state’s 
funding system violates Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits racial or 
ethnic discrimination by entities receiving 
federal funds. The plaintiffs contend that 
the state’s funding practices discriminate 
against school districts with large numbers 
of non-White students; they cite spending 
gaps between Philadelphia and suburban 
districts as well as between school districts 
with similar poverty levels but different 
racial and ethnic compositions. This lawsuit 
is still active, although it has been 
suspended under agreements between 
Mayor Street and then-Governor Ridge 
since summer 2000.The city and the state 
initially agreed to put the case on hold for 
one year after the state agreed to 
additional funding for the District for the 
2000-2001 school year. The suspension 
date was extended for 90 days on July 30, 
2001 in a Memorandum of Understanding 
signed by the city, state, and District.138 
 
These lawsuits served to formalize the 
District and city’s united front in the fight 
for equitable funding. However, they also 
caused deeper divides in the District’s 
relationship with state leaders and those 
divides, as we have described, led to 
decreased support from business leaders. 
The state court’s rejection of the school 
finance lawsuit made visible the battle 
between state and city and marked a 
turning point for District-city relations. The 
civil-rights lawsuit has been particularly 
offensive to leaders in Harrisburg because 
of the race-related charges it makes and 
also because, as a federal suit, it poses a 
more serious threat. 
 
 
                                                          
138 The deadlines originally set in the Memorandum of 
Understanding were extended until the end of 
November 2001; it is unclear whether the lawsuit’s 
suspension was included in that postponement. 
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THE MISSING STRATEGY: 
ENGAGE FRONTLINE 
EDUCATORS 
 
The School District’s relationships with its 
professional unions, the Philadelphia 
Federation of Teachers and the 
Commonwealth Association of School 
Administrators (CASA), were contentious 
over the course of Children Achieving.  
 
It seems like from the beginning of David 
Hornbeck’s reform efforts, the teachers 
haven’t been on board. I’m not sure why, 
but the teachers’ union is very powerful, 
and more often an instrument against 
change rather than for it. The District has to 
overcome that in order to make progress.139 
 
Like the PFT — you want to get their 
support, get them to support something 
even if it’s not the whole agenda. I haven’t 
met a teacher that has good things to say 
about Hornbeck, which is a shame. These 
are relationships that could have been 
developed.140 
 
Both the PFT and CASA offered strong 
objections to key components of Children 
Achieving, particularly to its accountability 
provisions. Tensions were highest when the 
District leaders attempted to reconstitute 
two high schools, plans which were 
ultimately halted by an independent 
arbitrator who ruled that the District had 
failed to engage in the necessary 
consultation with the PFT. PFT leaders 
repeatedly questioned the alignment of the 
SAT-9 assessment with the new District 
standards and were furious that the District 
never modified the formula for the 
accountability index despite their own 
protestations and the advice of an outside 
accountability panel. They also criticized 
the clusters as increased and unnecessary 
                                                          
139 Foundation leader, August 2000. 
 
140 Civic leader, June 2000. 
bureaucracy, and argued that the money 
would be better spent on early childhood 
education, smaller classes, and a District 
curriculum that would provide more 
direction to teachers on what to teach. 
 
Unlike their union leadership, who did not 
utter a single positive comment about 
Children Achieving or District leaders in 
five years of interviewing, rank-and-file 
teachers saw parts of the reform agenda as 
very beneficial. More than 80 percent of 
teachers believed that standards and small 
learning communities had the potential to 
have a positive impact on their students. 
But District leaders were not able to 
capitalize on this support. One reason was 
that teachers felt that reform leaders were 
dismissive of their hard work. Their 
frustration began upon Superintendent 
Hornbeck’s arrival.   
 
David helped to make education a hot 
agenda, but he didn’t give credit for what 
had been going on before. That wasn’t 
appropriate or humble.141  
 
Only four percent of teachers reported that 
they felt respected by the Superintendent.  
And this fact was not lost on many of our 
interviewees who lamented the lack of 
teacher engagement in the reform.  
 
Can you act on the belief that all children 
are capable of learning without a huge 
team that is invested in the same way. It 
feels as though we’ve come a long way, 
but I do think that the failure is that there 
are not enough professionals who think it’s 
[Children Achieving]  their plan. A high 
school student intern was here last week 
who told us that her science teacher said 
she hates Superintendent Hornbeck. How 
did we get to that?142 
 
                                                          
141 Higher education leader, November 2000. 
 
142 Civic leader, April 2000. 
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They decried the stance of both District 
and union leaders toward frontline 
educators. 
 
The District needs to figure out how to 
engage the good teachers. The 
Superintendent ignored them. And the 
District needs to make more of an effort to 
get the PFT on board rather than write 
them off. We’re now in a situation where 
the PFT is disclaiming the progress on test 
scores. It’s disclaiming the improvement 
brought about by its own membership! 
Hornbeck didn’t invent accountability or 
reconstitution. When will the PFT realize 
this is not going away? It’s a national 
trend.143 
 
Not building the support for the program 
was problematic. I think he tried, but he 
could have done more. But then I don’t 
think the business community or the PFT 
tried to help either.144 
 
Teachers were also demoralized by a 
central administration that they perceived 
as out of touch with the reality of schools. 
They were overwhelmed by demands of 
the reform and its mandate to do so many 
things at once. 
 
The communication piece of CA [Children 
Achieving] was always a source of 
frustration for me. I think they went forward 
way too fast for the internal audience to 
buy in and support the reforms. As a result, 
it took a lot longer for people to get it, and 
there was a constant undertow of disregard 
and disbelief.145 
 
Principals were even more alienated than 
teachers. Alleging that the pay-for-
performance system for school principals 
was not objective, CASA brought suit 
                                                          
143 Media leader, January 2000. 
 
144 Civic leader, September 2000. 
 
145 Children Achieving Challenge staff member, 
August 2000. 
against the District. Mistrust of central 
administration was so great that CASA 
leaders would not agree to support a 
survey of school principals as part of the 
Children Achieving evaluation for fear that 
its members would be sanctioned for their 
responses. Foley summarized the situation: 
 
Philadelphia leadership consistently 
underestimated the importance of 
developing and maintaining relationships 
with these important stakeholders. They 
discounted constituent perspectives, 
experiences, and ultimately, their power to 
hurt or help the School District. Other 
districts considering systemic reform efforts 
should work to collaborate with key 
stakeholders whenever possible and, at 
minimum, give respect to their 
perspectives and experiences.146 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Superintendent Hornbeck knew that strong 
public support was necessary to press for 
and sustain the ambitious improvements he 
hoped to make. But grossly inadequate 
funding for public education in 
Pennsylvania and economic stagnation in 
the city created a harsh context for 
coalition building. It pressed reform leaders 
to show swift, measurable results to gain 
public support and reinforced their 
defensiveness about their efforts. 
Superintendent Hornbeck’s all-or-nothing 
approach, and the lack of broad public 
discussion about the varied interpretations 
of the reform’s intentions, both contributed 
to the impermeable nature of the reform 
effort and left people feeling they did not 
have a role in developing or revising the 
reform approach. 
 
Strategies developed by city government 
and District leaders to build support for the 
reform and secure more funding from the 
city and the state proved largely 
                                                          
146 Foley, Contradictions and control in systemic 
reform, p. 42. 
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unsuccessful. Failure to take into account 
historical strengths of the District and its 
accomplishments alienated many teachers 
and principals who might have, under 
different circumstances, championed the 
ideas of Children Achieving and led efforts 
at implementation. And leaders of the 
professional unions adopted an 
obstructionist stance toward the reform at 
its inception and became increasingly 
isolated over the course of the reform.  
  
While most civic and foundation leaders 
continued to believe in the main principles 
of the reform plan, they were frustrated by 
Hornbeck’s alienation of frontline staff and 
state government leaders. For many of 
them, the man failed the ideas. 
 
Urban regime theorists divide political 
power into two spheres: private sector 
economic elites and government officials. 
In a capitalist economy, government 
officials cannot generate public policy 
without the cooperation of those who 
control economic production. Partnerships 
between the private sector and 
government constitute governing 
“regimes.” The degree to which these 
regimes attend to social change and the 
redistribution of resources to alleviate 
poverty and its effects varies. It depends on 
the degree to which corporate and 
government leaders are engaged with 
community groups that promote a social 
justice agenda. Without interaction among 
these sectors, private sector interests are 
likely to dominate public policy. 
Increasingly, state leaders have become 
prominent in urban regimes, particularly 
around education as urban school districts 
are dependent on governors and state 
legislators for funding and are governed by 
state policies.    
 
Over the course of the reform, the business 
community became increasingly isolated 
and alienated. Legal action against the 
state only served to further alienate state 
and business leaders and, given that state 
court officials are elected, was unlikely to 
yield a favorable ruling. Because 
Philadelphia lacked strong and united 
community organizations to advocate for 
more funding, it was hard to persuade 
business leaders that a redistribution of 
resources was necessary if Children 
Achieving was to reach its ambitious goal 
of all students reaching high standards.  
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LESSONS FOR THE 
FUTURE 
 
 think the ability to have a running 
conversation about achievement for all 
kids for four years running is a huge 
accomplishment. I think that people 
on the street have something to say about 
the education crisis we’re facing…It gives 
us something to build on, but we have to 
remember that it takes a long time.147 
 
Our research shows how difficult it is to 
build the resilient civic coalitions necessary 
for improving urban schools, especially in 
the harsh circumstances of inadequate 
funding. David Hornbeck was an attractive 
candidate for Philadelphia’s 
superintendency. He brought star power as 
a national educational reform figure, and a 
passionate commitment to improving both 
urban schools and the life chances of poor 
students of color. He also had a strong 
belief that his systemic approach to school 
reform could turn around a poorly 
performing urban school system. The 
Children Achieving reform was adopted as 
Hornbeck’s plan, but in its six years of 
implementation, it never became a civic 
undertaking; that is, an effort widely 
understood and championed by business, 
civic, and government elites, and frontline 
educators who would work tirelessly for its 
success.  
 
Although Hornbeck’s approach to systemic 
reform — the combination of standards, 
accountability, and decentralization — was 
being widely discussed in national 
education policy circles for its potential, it 
was not yet a proven theory of change. In 
Philadelphia, the selling of systemic reform 
as comprehensive common sense and as a 
package that “all had to be done at once,” 
undercut the possibility for the input and 
accommodations necessary for building 
                                                          
147 Civic leader, August 2000. 
alliances for reform. It discouraged critical 
questions, reflection, and revision — all 
necessary for organizational learning.  
 
From the time of his arrival, Superintendent 
Hornbeck faced difficult odds. Inadequate 
school funding forced a leadership stance 
of, “We have the best possible reform plan.  
We are making and will continue to make 
remarkable progress.” But selling systemic 
reform on a grand scale contributed to 
widespread disillusionment when common 
sense didn’t deliver the results anticipated. 
Many of the people we spoke with 
expressed the feeling, “We’ve done the 
best and the most that can be done; let the 
state take over.” 
    
There were missteps by reform leaders on 
many fronts — all stemming from the 
mistaken beliefs that a reform coalition 
could be created around a fixed agenda 
and that those who built the agenda should 
make all the decisions from the center 
about whether and how to change it. But 
other stakeholder sectors also missed 
opportunities to offer positive leadership. 
For example, the business community was 
ambivalent about its role in public 
education and failed to lead an advocacy 
effort for revisions to the state’s school 
funding formula. Likewise, the Philadelphia 
Federation of Teachers was reactive around 
its self-interests and never engaged in a 
constructive way around accountability and 
changes in work rules — issues that had 
and continue to have broad public support. 
And the isolation of these two groups from 
other sectors was an obstacle to coalition 
building.      
 
COMMON GROUND  
 
Certainly, the six years of Children 
Achieving were not for naught. 
Philadelphians know more about what it 
takes to improve schools than they did six 
years ago. There is a better understanding 
of the enormity of the problem and a 
I 
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stronger consensus around key ideas which 
together could form the cornerstones for 
future improvement strategies. Some of 
these ideas are the direct legacy of 
Children Achieving — a recognition of its 
accomplishments. Others are the hard 
lessons gleaned from the reform’s 
disappointments. Current leaders need to 
recognize this knowledge and use it to 
shape strategies that have a chance at 
gaining legitimacy in the community.   
 
In order of frequency mentioned by our 
interviewees, ideas for improving schools 
included the following: (The number of 
times the idea was mentioned appears in 
parenthesis.) 
 
• Increase funding for the city’s schools 
(35) 
 
• Build coalitions of support for 
improving public education (27) 
 
• Improve the quality of the teaching 
workforce (26) 
 
• Provide access to data about how 
schools are faring as the foundation for 
public accountability (24) 
 
• Set high standards for all students’ 
learning (24) 
 
• Continue full-day kindergarten and a 
research-based approach to literacy in 
the early grades (18) 
 
• Seek changes in the teachers contract 
(18) 
 
We elaborate these ideas below. 
 
Increase funding for the city’s schools. 
Interviewees believed that increased 
funding was required to improve the 
schools and student achievement. While 
many acknowledged that there might be 
inefficiencies in the District, they believed 
that there were unavoidable costs to 
ensuring that students had access to a 
high-quality education. For example, 
increased compensation for teachers and 
intensive attention to early childhood 
education were two budget items around 
which there was wide agreement. 
 
Coalition building. Our informants were 
adamant about the need for coalitions, not 
finger pointing. They recognized that 
public engagement in schools increased 
during Children Achieving:  
 
Education is much more on people’s minds. 
There used to be despair and no attention. 
It is now widely understood that problems 
need to be addressed.148  
 
There has been progress in building some 
community support for education. People 
are getting involved, and that is healthy. 
David did a good job initially in mobilizing 
the foundations and the business 
community. He got them behind his 
agenda. It was a big improvement over the 
previous administration when we had to 
fight to get a hearing.149 
 
However, they were weary of accusations 
and counter-accusations. Most looked to 
leadership from the Mayor and the 
Governor to heal the political rifts and 
move forward.  
 
The number one thing is the need for a 
citywide, if not region-wide, groundswell of 
support that public education is important.   
 
Improve the quality of the teaching 
workforce. Teacher and principal quality 
was very much on people’s minds and they 
knew that it would take multiple steps to 
address these issues including: stronger 
recruitment strategies, increased 
                                                          
148 Civic leader, April 2000. 
 
149 Business leader, August 2000. 
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compensation, and effective professional 
development.  
 
The emphasis on teacher development and 
training has been really important. It’s so 
critical to kids being able to do well. It’s the 
teachers who are going to make a 
difference at the individual level.150 
 
Those who worked closest to the reform 
also named ways to improve professional 
development. They emphasized a focus on 
content and sustained professional 
development that followed teachers into 
their classrooms. But interviewees who 
were more distanced from schools had 
little concept of the intensity of training 
necessary to strengthen classroom 
instruction. Reform leaders need to be 
aware of this and develop strategies that 
will encourage big investments in 
professional learning and patience about 
their effects.   
 
Provide access to data about how schools 
are faring as the foundation for public 
accountability. Informants applauded 
District leaders for being forthcoming with 
data about schools’ performance. 
 
The emphasis on monitoring the 
achievement of kids, and being open about 
the information needs to be continued. 
With Connie Clayton, they obscured it. 
David’s actually holding himself up and 
holding the Philadelphia School District up 
for review.151 
 
The public will be watching to ascertain 
how open new leaders are to scrutiny. Will 
data be readily available in ways that allow 
comparison across reform approaches?  
Will researchers, parents, and community 
members have access to schools to 
observe the quality of educational 
programs?   
                                                          
150 Foundation leader, August 2000. 
 
151 Foundation leader, August 2000 
Set high standards for all students’ 
learning. Informants remained supportive 
of the idea of standards.  
 
Certainly having the goal that you can 
produce world-class education in a student 
generation needs to be out there.152   
 
However, our research points to the need 
for discussions about what standards are 
and how they are manifest in the reform’s 
approach. 
 
Continue full-day kindergarten and a 
research-based approach to literacy in 
the early grades. A number of our 
respondents believed that Children 
Achieving had brought important changes 
in the educational experiences of 
significant numbers of the system’s 
youngest students. They pointed to the 
establishment of full-day kindergarten and 
the attention to literacy in the early grades 
where there were also reductions in class 
size as offering a whole generation of 
youngsters a strong start in school. 
 
There are children whose lives have been 
changed forever. If you were a child 
entering kindergarten five years ago, 
chances are that you’re a better reader. 
There were maybe 100,000 kids who were 
positively impacted by full-day 
kindergarten reduced class size. You can 
really only judge the benefits and the 
progress by looking at those kids. The 
reform was intended to take a full 
generation of children to really take root.153 
  
Seek changes in the teacher contract. 
Informants believed that there needed to 
be significant changes to the teacher 
contract. One government leader 
summarized the opinions of most of our 
interviewees. 
 
                                                          
152 Business leader, August 2000. 
 
153 Business leader, August 2000. 
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I think we have to make some radical 
changes to the teachers’ contract if we’re 
going to get any real changes. We need to 
change the contract provisions around 
hiring, transfer, and assignment so that our 
schools with the highest poverty aren’t 
penalized. Also, I believe principals when 
they complain that they are held 
accountable and can’t hire their own 
staff.154  
 
LESSONS ABOUT COALITION 
BUILDING 
 
Educational reforms often falter in the 
absence of strong public engagement. 
Understanding the reform strategy that 
preceded state takeover, how it contrasted 
with other approaches to improving public 
education, how it was understood by 
community leaders, and how they assessed 
its accomplishments and failures offers 
important information to the School 
Reform Commission as it deliberates the 
future of public education and seeks to 
build public support for its plan. As they 
craft new plans for Philadelphia schools 
and seek support for the hard work of 
sustained educational improvement, it’s 
imperative that they heed the past. In 
addition to the strategies identified above 
by our interviewees, we offer the following 
lessons gleaned from our research on the 
Children Achieving reform:     
 
Capitalize on strengths and prior 
accomplishments. It’s tempting to 
condemn all that has gone before as a way 
to build support for change. This is why the 
baby is so often thrown out with the bath 
water in educational reform. But, starting 
from scratch wastes time and talent, 
ignores what has been shown to be 
effective, alienates the good educators 
who were responsible for prior 
accomplishments and could be leaders in 
the next phase of reform, and increases 
                                                          
154 Government leader, March 2000. 
public cynicism about educational reform 
and its leaders.   
   
Openly discuss competing reform ideas. 
Public dialogue about proposals for 
improving schools is central to building the 
public will necessary for the long haul. 
Educators need to adequately explain what 
they’re doing and why. Leaders and 
ordinary citizens need to understand and 
be able to talk about different reform 
strategies and theories of action. They 
need to delve beneath education jargon to 
explore various interpretations of ideas. 
Only then will the city be able to have a 
productive dialogue about what will work 
in its schools. It is during such 
conversations that various sectors of the 
community can understand one another’s 
perspectives, find common ground, and 
move forward. 
 
Seek feedback about plans to improve 
schools and listen to what others have to 
say. As plans go forward, discuss their 
progress, reflect openly on 
accomplishments and challenges, seek 
input, make mid-course corrections, and 
explain them. An informed public is more 
likely to be supportive and to sustain their 
support over time. 
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APPENDIX A. RESEARCH 
METHODS 
 
A research team conducted 42 interviews 
of civic elites between January 2000 and 
January 2001.155 Interviewees were leaders 
from 10 sectors: civic institutions, current 
and former School Board members, 
businesses, foundations, District leaders, 
Children Achieving Challenge staff, higher 
education, media, government, and labor. 
(School Board members were also leaders 
in other sectors.)   
 
The research team chose interviewees 
according to several criteria: 
 
• Leadership in an institution that was 
involved in Philadelphia public 
education and/or leadership in one of 
the 10 sectors identified as important 
to represent; 
 
• Knowledge of the Children Achieving 
reform; and 
 
• Identification by other interviewees as 
an important source of information to 
them or as having an important/ 
interesting perspective on public 
education. 
 
Interviews were semi-structured and 
generally took about one hour. The 
interview protocol was designed to elicit 
perspectives of the interviewees on the 
following topics:  
 
• Public schools in the larger social, 
economic, and political context of the 
city; 
 
• Sources of information on how the 
schools are doing;  
                                                          
155 Our protocol was based on that used by Shipps, 
Sconzert, and Swyers in their evaluation of the 
Chicago Annenberg Challenge (see footnote 51).   
• Understanding of the Children 
Achieving reform plan; 
 
• Assessment of the District’s progress 
during the reform effort and what 
accounted for that progress or lack of 
progress; and 
 
• Prognosis for public schools.    
 
The majority of interviews occurred during 
two time periods, one between January 
and April 2000, and the other between 
August and October 2000. Because the 
School District was at different moments of 
transition and uncertainty during most of 
the interviews, we also asked informants for 
their perspectives on the most recent 
events affecting the schools. These events 
included: 
 
• January 2000. John Street’s 
inauguration as Mayor and his 
appointment of a new School Board;  
 
• June 2000. Superintendent David 
Hornbeck’s resignation;  
 
• August 2000. Threatened teachers’ 
strike; and 
 
• August-October 2000. New leadership 
structure for the central office, 
including the appointment of a Chief 
Education Officer and a Chief 
Academic Officer. 
 
Secondary data sources included literature 
reviews, documents from the Children 
Achieving Challenge, and articles from 
local newspaper archives. Additionally, the 
research for this report occurred within the 
larger context of the five-year, multi-
method evaluation of the Children 
Achieving Challenge. We drew heavily from 
insights gained from hundreds of 
interviews and observations in central and 
cluster offices and schools to make sense 
of the data collected for this report.  
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Sector 
Number of 
Interviews 
Male Female White 
African 
American 
Latino Asian 
Leaders of Civic 
Institutions  
9 
(20.0%) 
5 4 5 4 - - 
Current/Former School 
Board Members 
7 
(15.6%) 
5 2 2 4 1 - 
Business Leaders 
5 
(11.1%) 
5 - 5 - - - 
School District 
Employees/Leaders 
5 
(11.1%) 
1 4 4 1 - - 
Foundation Staff 
4 
(8.9%) 
2 2 3 1 - - 
Children Achieving 
Challenge Staff  
4 
(8.9%) 
1 3 3 - - 1 
Higher Education Faculty 
and Administrators 
3 
(6.7%) 
2 1 3 - - - 
Media 
3 
(6.7%) 
2 1 3 - - - 
Government 
3 
(6.7%) 
1 2 1 2 - - 
Labor 
2 
(4.4%) 
2 - 1 1 - - 
Total 
45 
(100%) 
26 
(57.8%) 
19 
42.2%) 
30 
(66.7%) 
13  
28.9%) 
1  
(2.2%) 
1 
(2.2%) 
 
 
 
 
